

Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses

Council Draft No. 12

(December 2021)

SUBJECTS COVERED

ARTICLE 213	Sections 213.0-213.11J (black letter only; provisions marked by * for
	reapproval following motions approved at 2021 Annual Meeting
APPENDIX A	Text of Amendments Approved at 2021 Annual Meeting
APPENDIX B	Comparison of Black Letter – Tentative Draft No. 5 to Council Draft No. 12
APPENDIX C	Pertinent Provisions of 1962 Model Penal Code

The Executive Office
The American Law Institute
4025 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-3099
Telephone: (215) 243-1626 • Fax: (215) 243-1636

E-mail: ali@ali.org • Website: http://www.ali.org

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DEREK P. LANGHAUSER, Maine Maritime Academy and Community Colleges, Cumberland Foreside, ME

CAROL F. LEE, Taconic Capital Advisors, New York, NY

DAVID F. LEVI, Duke University School of Law, Durham, NC

LANCE LIEBMAN*, Columbia Law School, New York, NY

GOODWIN LIU, California Supreme Court, San Francisco, CA

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, New York, NY

GERARD E. LYNCH, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, New York, NY

LORI A. MARTIN, WilmerHale, New York, NY

TROY A. MCKENZIE, New York University School of Law, New York, NY

M. MARGARET MCKEOWN, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, San Diego, CA

JUDITH A. MILLER, Chevy Chase, MD

PATRICIA ANN MILLETT, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Washington, DC

JANET NAPOLITANO, University of California Berkeley, Goldman School of Public Policy, Berkeley, CA

KATHLEEN M. O'SULLIVAN, Perkins Coie, Seattle, WA

^{*}Director Emeritus

STEPHANIE E. PARKER, Jones Day, Atlanta, GA

ERIC A. POSNER, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL

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LEE H. ROSENTHAL, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX

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ANTHONY J. SCIRICA, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, Philadelphia, PA

VIRGINIA A. SEITZ, Sidley Austin, Washington, DC

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CATHERINE T. STRUVE, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, Philadelphia, PA

JEFFREY S. SUTTON, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Columbus, OH

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SARAH S. VANCE, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA

SETH P. WAXMAN, WilmerHale, Washington, DC

STEVEN O. WEISE, Proskauer Rose LLP, Los Angeles, CA

DIANE P. WOOD, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Chicago, IL

COUNCIL EMERITI

KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, VA

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MICHAEL BOUDIN, U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Boston, MA

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GEORGE H. T. DUDLEY, Dudley Newman Feuerzeig, St. Thomas, U.S. VI

CHRISTINE M. DURHAM, Utah Supreme Court (retired), Salt Lake City, UT

CONRAD K. HARPER, New York, NY

D. BROCK HORNBY, U.S. District Court, District of Maine, Portland, ME

CAROLYN DINEEN KING, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Houston, TX

CAROLYN B. LAMM, White & Case, Washington, DC

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, VA

PIERRE N. LEVAL, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, New York, NY

BETSY LEVIN, Washington, DC

MARTIN LIPTON, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, NY

MYLES V. LYNK, District of Columbia Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Washington, DC

MARGARET H. MARSHALL, Choate Hall & Stewart, Cambridge, MA

 $\label{eq:conditional} \mbox{JOHN J. "MIKE" MCKETTA III, Graves, Dougherty, Hearon \& Moody, Austin, TX}$

ROBERT H. MUNDHEIM, Shearman & Sterling, Tucson, AZ

KATHRYN A. OBERLY, District of Columbia Court of Appeals (retired), Palm Beach, FL

HARVEY S. PERLMAN, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, NE

ELLEN ASH PETERS, Connecticut Supreme Court (retired), Hartford, CT

ROBERTA COOPER RAMO*, Modrall Sperling, Albuquerque, NM

MARY M. SCHROEDER, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Phoenix, AZ

ROBERT A. STEIN, University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis, MN

MICHAEL TRAYNOR*, Cobalt LLP, Berkeley, CA

FREDERICK WILLIAM (BILL) WAGNER, Wagner McLaughlin, Tampa, FL

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, Milbank LLP (retired), Washington, DC

HERBERT P. WILKINS, Concord, MA

^{*}President Emeritus and Chair of the Council Emeritus

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Reporter

Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer New York University School of Law 40 Washington Square South # 322B New York, NY 10012-1005 Email: stephen.schulhofer@nyu.edu

Associate Reporter

Professor Erin E. Murphy New York University School of Law 40 Washington Square South # 419 New York, NY 10012-1005 Email: erin.murphy@nyu.edu

Director

Professor Richard L. Revesz The Executive Office THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 4025 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104-3099 Email: director@ALL.org

Deputy Director

Ms. Stephanie A. Middleton The Executive Office THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 4025 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19104-3099 Email: smiddleton@ALI.org

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REPORTER

STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, New York University School of Law, New York, NY

ASSOCIATE REPORTER

ERIN E. MURPHY, New York University School of Law, New York, NY

ADVISERS

MICHELLE J. ANDERSON, Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, NY

SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, MO

JANIS M. BERRY, Attorney at Law (retired), Marblehead, MA

SAMUEL W. BUELL, Duke University School of Law, Durham, NC

I. BENNETT CAPERS, Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY

W. TUCKER CARRINGTON, University of Mississippi School of Law, University, MS

ROBERT M. CARY, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC

SARAH DEER, University of Kansas School of Law, Lawrence, KS

DEBORAH W. DENNO, Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY

PAUL STEVEN DIAMOND, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA

ARTHUR T. DONATO, Media, PA

RONALD EISENBERG, Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, Philadelphia, PA

DONNA LEE ELM, Law Practice of Donna Elm, Cottonwood, AZ

MARY D. FAN, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle, WA

KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, University of Pennsylvania Carey School of Law, Philadelphia,

TERRY L. FROMSON, Women's Law Project, Philadelphia, PA

FATIMA GOSS GRAVES, National Women's Law Center, Washington, DC

AYA GRUBER, University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, CO

ROSEMARY HART, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC

BARBARA PARKER HERVEY, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Austin, TX

WILLIAM M. JACKSON, District of Columbia Superior Court, Washington, DC

VIRGINIA M. KENDALL, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Chicago, IL

NELLY N. KHOUZAM, Florida Second District Court of Appeal, Tampa, FL

DEREK P. LANGHAUSER, Maine Maritime Academy and Community Colleges, Cumberland Foreside, ME

JENNIFER G. LONG, AEquitas, Washington, DC

GERARD E. LYNCH, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, New York, NY

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, MI

DANIEL J. MELTZER, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA [Deceased 2015]

NANCY E. O'MALLEY, Alameda County District Attorney's Office, Oakland, CA

WENDY L. PATRICK, County of San Diego District Attorney's Office, San Diego, CA

LEE H. ROSENTHAL, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX

DAVID RUDOVSKY, Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing, Feinberg & Lin, Philadelphia, PA

JON M. SANDS, Federal Public Defender, District of Arizona, Phoenix, AZ

SUELLYN SCARNECCHIA, University of Michigan Law School (retired), Ann Arbor, MI

ABBE SMITH, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC

DARRYL ANTONIO STALLWORTH, The Law Office of Darryl A. Stallworth, Oakland, CA

CAROL S. STEIKER, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

JEANNIE SUK GERSEN, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

RONALD S. SULLIVAN, JR., Harvard Law School, Criminal Justice Institute, Cambridge, MA

ANDREW E. TASLITZ, American University, Washington College of the Law, Washington, DC [Deceased 2014]

REGGIE B. WALTON, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, Washington, DC JOAN PATRICIA WEBER, San Diego Superior Court, San Diego, CA COREY RAYBURN YUNG, University of Kansas School of Law, Lawrence, KS

LIAISONS

LAURA DUNN, L.L. Dunn Law Firm, Washington, DC
ERIN EARP, Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, Washington, DC
CYNTHIA GARRETT, Families Advocating for Campus Equality, San Diego, CA
REBECCA HENRY, ABA Commission on Domestic & Sexual Violence, Washington, DC
MICHAEL J. IACOPINO, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Manchester, NH
NORMAN L. REIMER, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Washington, DC
RICHARD SCOTT SCHMECHEL, D.C. Criminal Code Reform Commission, Washington, DC
EBONY TUCKER, National Alliance to End Sexual Violence, Washington, DC

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Once it is approved by both the Council and membership, a Tentative Draft represents the most current statement of the Institute's position on the subject and may be cited in opinions or briefs in accordance with Bluebook rule 12.9.4, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 847A (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 17, 1974), until the official text is published. The vote of approval allows for possible further revision of the drafts to reflect the discussion at the Annual Meeting and to make editorial improvements.

The drafting cycle continues in this manner until each segment of the project has been approved by both the Council and the membership. When extensive changes are required, the Reporter may be asked to prepare a Proposed Final Draft of the entire work, or appropriate portions thereof, for review by the Council and membership. Review of this draft is not de novo, and ordinarily is limited to consideration of whether changes previously decided upon have been accurately and adequately carried out.

The typical ALI Section is divided into three parts: black letter, Comment, and Reporter's Notes. In some instances there may also be a separate Statutory Note. Although each of these components is subject to review by the project's Advisers and Members Consultative Group and by the Council and the membership, only the black letter and Comment are regarded as the work of the Institute. The Reporter's and Statutory Notes remain the work of the Reporter.

MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES

COUNCIL DRAFT No. 12

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PROJECT STATUS AT A GLANCE

Section 213.0(2)(e) (formerly Section 213.0(3) in T.D. No. 2) – approved as amended at 2016 Annual Meeting; approved by Council Oct. 2016

Section 213.0(2)(a) and (b) (formerly Section 213.0(1) and (2) in T.D. No. 3) – approved at 2017 Annual Meeting

Part I, Grading, and Part II, consisting of black letter and commentary of Sections 213.0 through 213.11J (other than previously approved portions of Section 213.0(2)(a), (b), and (e)) – approved at 2021 Annual Meeting; this marks completion of the project, pending Council approval of amendments approved at the 2021 Annual Meeting

History of Material in This Draft

The Council approved the start of this project in 2012. The most recent earlier version of black letter and commentary to Sections 213.0 through 213.11J can be found in Tentative Draft No. 5 (2021).

Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses

Council Draft No. 12

Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reporter

December 7, 2021

REPORTERS' MEMORANDUM

This Council Draft contains the complete text of the black letter for the completed project to amend *Article 213 of the Model Penal Code*. In January 2021, Council approved black letter of equivalent scope in CD 11 and submitted it to the membership. At the Annual Meeting in June 2021, the membership passed a number of amendments and then gave its approval to that black letter, as amended. Where amended, the black-letter language has not yet been considered by Council, which accordingly must now decide whether to approve it.

Most of the amendments suggested a direction for revision rather than a definitive text and left it to the Reporter to translate the sense of each amendment into language that could be properly integrated into the final black letter. Subsequently, the Reporter, together with ALI staff, especially Ben Brady, completed the process of interpreting the sense of the amendments in light of discussion at the Annual Meeting, consulting with sponsors of the amendments where necessary, drafting suitable final language, and integrating it into the black letter. Council Draft 12 embodies the result of that process. In effect, it represents the exact black-letter text approved by the membership, subject only to the editorial prerogative of Boskey-compliant revisions.

The usual Comments and Reporters' Notes do not accompany this Draft because none of the amendments supersedes or renders inaccurate the Comments and Reporters' Notes included in D 5. Those Comments and Reporters' Notes remain adequate to support the black letter as amended.

The first section of this Council Draft contains that black letter, with signals to indicate amended language that requires Council approval. The Appendices contain, respectively: A, the text of the membership-approved amendments, as originally presented to the Annual Meeting; B, a comparison document showing the differences between the black letter of this Council Draft and that of TD 5; and C, the text of the 1962 Code provisions that are pertinent to revised Article 213.

Associate Reporter Erin Murphy is currently on leave from the project and did not participate in preparing this Council Draft. She expects to return to the project in the Fall of 2022.

ARTICLE 213

BLACK LETTER

1 2	(Text marked with an asterisk indicates a change approved by the membership at the 2021Annual Meeting that now requires Council approval.)
3	SECTION 213.0. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY; DEFINITIONS
4	(1) This Article is governed by Part I of the 1962 Model Penal Code, and the
5	definitions given in Section 210.0, except that:
6	(a) Section 2.11 (the definition of "consent") does not apply to this article.
7	(b) Subsection (2) of Section 2.08 (Intoxication) does not apply to this article.
8	Instead, the general provisions of the criminal law and rules of evidence of the
9	jurisdiction govern the materiality of the actor's intoxication in determining the
10	actor's culpability for an offense.
11	(2) Definitions
12	In this Article, unless a different definition is plainly required:
13	(a) "Sexual penetration" means an act involving penetration, however slight,
14	of the anus or genitalia by an object or a body part, except when done for legitimate
15	medical, hygienic, or law-enforcement purposes.
16	(b) "Oral sex" means a touching of the anus or genitalia of one person by the
17	mouth or tongue of another person.
18	(c) "Sexual contact" means any of the following acts, when the actor's purpose
19	is the sexual arousal, sexual gratification, sexual humiliation, or sexual degradation
20	of any person:
21	(i) touching the clothed or unclothed genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
22	buttocks, or inner thigh of any person with any body part or object; or
23	(ii) touching any body part of any person with the clothed or unclothed
24	genitalia, anus, groin, breast, buttocks, or inner thigh of any person; or
25	(iii) touching any clothed or unclothed body part of any person with the
26	ejaculate of any person.
27	The touching described in paragraph (c) includes the actor touching another
28	person, another person touching the actor or a third party, or another person

1	touching that person's own body. It does not include the actor touching the actor's
2	own body.
3	(d) "Fondling" means prolonged contact with or manipulation of the genitals,
4	when the actor's purpose is the sexual arousal, sexual gratification, sexual
5	humiliation, or sexual degradation of any person. Fondling requires more than a
6	transient grope or grab. "To fondle" means to engage in fondling.
7	(e) "Consent"
8	(i) "Consent" for purposes of Article 213 means a person's willingness
9	to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact.
10	(ii) Consent may be express or it may be inferred from behavior—both
11	action and inaction—in the context of all the circumstances.
12	(iii) Neither verbal nor physical resistance is required to establish that
13	consent is lacking, but their absence may be considered, in the context of all
14	the circumstances, in determining the issue of consent.
15	(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (2)(e)(ii) of this Section, consent is
16	ineffective when given by a person incompetent to consent or under
17	circumstances precluding the free exercise of consent, as provided in Sections
18	213.1, 213.2, 213.3, 213.4, 213.5, 213.7, 213.8, and 213.9.
19	(v) Consent may be revoked or withdrawn any time before or during
20	the act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact. A clear verbal
21	refusal—such as "No," "Stop," or "Don't"—establishes the lack of consent or
22	the revocation or withdrawal of previous consent. Lack of consent or
23	revocation or withdrawal of consent may be overridden by subsequent consent
24	given prior to the act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact.
25	(f) Force.
26	(i) "Physical force or restraint" means a physical act or physical
27	restraint that inflicts more than negligible physical harm, pain, or discomfort
28	or that significantly restricts a person's ability to move freely. More than
29	negligible physical harm includes but is not limited to a burn, black eye, or
30	bloody nose, and more than negligible pain or discomfort includes but is not
31	limited to the pain or discomfort resulting from a kick, punch, or slap on the

1	face.
2	(ii) "Aggravated physical force or restraint" means a physical act or
3	physical restraint that inflicts or is capable of inflicting death, serious bodily
4	injury, or extreme physical pain, or that confines another for a substantial
5	period in a place of isolation other than under color of law.
6	(g) "Actor" means a person more than 12 years old, except that "actor"
7	includes a person younger than 12 when the charge is Sexual Assault by Aggravated
8	Physical Force or Restraint (Section 213.1). "Actor" includes, where relevant, a
9	person guilty of an omission.
10	(h) "Registrable offense"
11	(i) "Registrable offense" means an offense that makes a convicted
12	person eligible for or subject to any of the collateral consequences specified in
13	Section 213.11.
14	(ii) No offense is a registrable offense under any provision of law unless
15	it is specifically so designated in this Article or is committed in another
16	jurisdiction, is a registrable offense in that jurisdiction, and would be a
17	registrable offense in this jurisdiction if it had been committed in this
18	jurisdiction.
19	SECTION 213.1. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY AGGRAVATED PHYSICAL FORCE OR RESTRAINT
20	(1) Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint. An actor is guilty of
21	Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint when:
22	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
23	penetration or oral sex; and
24	(b) the act is without effective consent because:
25	(i) the actor uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use aggravated
26	physical force or restraint against anyone; and
27	(ii) the actor's use of or threat to use aggravated physical force or
28	restraint causes the other person to submit to or perform the act of sexual
29	penetration or oral sex; and

1	*(c) the actor acts knowingly with respect to the conduct, attendant
2	circumstances, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
3	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint is a registrable
4	offense. It is a felony of the third degree [10-year maximum], except that (1) the maximum
5	term of imprisonment is five years greater than that otherwise applicable to a felony of the
6	third degree; and (2) it is a felony of the second degree [2θ -year maximum] if the actor violates
7	subsection (1) of this Section and in so doing:
8	(a) knowingly uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use a deadly weapon
9	and knows that this act causes the other person to submit to or perform the act of
10	sexual penetration or oral sex; or
11	(b) knowingly acts with one or more persons who:
12	(i) also engage in an act or acts of sexual penetration or oral sex with
13	the same victim at the same place at a time contemporaneous with the actor's
14	violation of this Section; or
15	(ii) assist in the use of or threat to use aggravated physical force or
16	restraint when the actor's act of sexual penetration or oral sex occurs; or
17	*(c) recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any person.
18	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
19	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex under the
20	circumstances described in subsection(1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct
21	that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring in
22	a circumstance described in that subsection. If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative
23	defense of Explicit Prior Permission according to the terms of Section 213.10.
24	SECTION 213.2. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY PHYSICAL FORCE OR RESTRAINT
25	(1) Sexual Assault by Physical Force or Restraint. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault
26	by Physical Force or Restraint when:
27	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
28	penetration or oral sex; and
29	(b) the act is without effective consent because:

1	(i) the actor uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use physical
2	force or restraint against anyone; and
3	(ii) the actor's use of or threat to use physical force or restraint causes
4	the other person to submit to or perform the act of sexual penetration or oral
5	sex; and
6	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
7	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
8	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Physical Force or Restraint is a felony of the third
9	degree [10-year maximum]. It is a registrable offense when the actor has previously been
10	convicted of a felony sex offense.
11	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
12	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex under the
13	circumstances described in subsection (1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct
14	that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring in
15	a circumstance described in that subsection. If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative
16	defense of Explicit Prior Permission according to the terms of Section 213.10.
17	SECTION 213.3. SEXUAL ASSAULT OF AN INCAPACITATED, VULNERABLE, OR LEGALLY
18	RESTRICTED PERSON
19	(1) Sexual Assault of an Incapacitated Person. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault of
20	an Incapacitated Person when:
21	*(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
22	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
23	or oral sex; and
24	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act, the other
25	person:
26	(i) is sleeping, unconscious, or physically unable to communicate lack
27	of consent; or
28	(ii) lacks substantial capacity to appraise, control, or remember the
29	person's own sexual conduct or that of anyone else because of a substance

1	administered to that person, without that person's knowledge or consent;
2	and the actor administered the incapacitating substance for the purpose of
3	causing that incapacity or knows that it was surreptitiously administered by
4	another for that purpose; and
5	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
6	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
7	Sexual Assault of an Incapacitated Person is a felony of the third degree [10-year
8	maximum]. It is a registrable offense when the actor has previously been convicted of a felony
9	sex offense.
10	(2) Sexual Assault of a Vulnerable Person. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault of a
11	Vulnerable Person when:
12	*(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
13	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
14	or oral sex; and
15	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act, the other
16	person:
17	(i) has an intellectual, developmental, or mental disability, or a mental
18	illness, that makes the person substantially incapable of appraising the nature
19	of the sexual activity involved, or of understanding the right to give or
20	withhold consent in sexual encounters, and the actor has no similarly serious
21	disability; or
22	(ii) is passing in and out of consciousness; or
23	(iii) lacks substantial capacity to communicate lack of consent; or
24	(iv) is wholly or partly undressed, or in the process of undressing, for
25	the purpose of receiving nonsexual professional or commercial services from
26	the actor and has not given the actor explicit prior permission to engage in that
27	act; and
28	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
29	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
30	Sexual Assault of a Vulnerable Person is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year
31	maximum].

1	(3) Sexual Assault of a Legally Restricted Person. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault of
2	Legally Restricted Person when:
3	*(a) the actor, who did not have a consensual sexually intimate relationship
4	with the other person at the time that a state-imposed restriction on that person's
5	liberty began, engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another person
6	or causes the other person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral
7	sex; and
8	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act, the other
9	person is:
10	(i) in custody, incarcerated, on probation, on parole, under civil
11	commitment, in a pretrial release or pretrial diversion or treatment program,
12	or in any other status involving a state-imposed restriction on liberty; and
13	(ii) the actor is in a position of actual or apparent authority or
14	supervision over the restriction on the other person's liberty; and
15	*(c) the actor acts knowingly with respect to the conduct, attendant
16	circumstances, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
17	Sexual Assault of a Legally Restricted Person is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year
18	maximum].
19	(4) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when a
20	condition or circumstance described in subsections (1)(b), (2)(b), or (3)(b) existed at the time
21	the other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex.
22	Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not
23	constitute effective consent when occurring in a condition or circumstance described in these
24	subsections.
25	SECTION 213.4. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY EXTORTION
26	(1) Sexual Assault by Extortion. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault by Extortion
27	when:
28	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
29	penetration or oral sex; and

Section 213.4. Sexual Assault by Extortion

1	(b) the act is without effective consent because the actor explicitly or implicitly
2	threatened:
3	(i) to accuse that person or anyone else of a criminal offense or of a
4	failure to comply with immigration regulations; or
5	(ii) to take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take
6	or withhold action, whether or not the purported official has actual authority
7	to do so; or
8	(iii) to take any action or cause any consequence that would cause
9	submission to or performance of the act of sexual penetration or oral sex by
10	someone of ordinary resolution in that person's situation under all the
11	circumstances; and
12	(iv) the actor's threat causes the other person to submit to or perform
13	the act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and
14	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
15	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
16	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Extortion is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year
17	maximum].
18	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
19	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex because of
20	a threat described in subsection (1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that
21	would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring in a
22	circumstance described in that paragraph. If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative
23	defense of Explicit Prior Permission under Section 213.10.
24	SECTION 213.5. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY PROHIBITED DECEPTION
25	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault by Prohibited Deception when:
26	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
27	penetration or oral sex; and
28	(b) the act is without effective consent because:
29	(i) the actor caused the other person to believe falsely that the act had

1	diagnostic, curative, or preventive medical properties; or
2	(ii) the actor caused the other person to believe falsely that the actor
3	was someone else who was personally known to that person; and
4	(iii) the actor's deception causes the other person to submit to or perform
5	the act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and
6	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
7	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
8	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Prohibited Deception is a felony of the fifth degree
9	[three-year maximum].
10	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
11	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex because of
12	a circumstance described in subsection (1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or
13	conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when
14	occurring in a circumstance described in that paragraph.
15	SECTION 213.6. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSENT
16	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when:
17	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
18	penetration or oral sex; and
19	(b) the other person does not consent to that act; and
20	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
21	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
22	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent is a felony of the fifth degree
23	[three-year maximum], except that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum]
24	when:
25	(a) the other person has, by words or actions, expressly communicated
26	unwillingness to submit to or perform the act, or the act is so sudden or unexpected
27	that the other person has no adequate opportunity to express unwillingness before the
28	act occurs; and

1	ın paragraph (a).
2	(3) If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative defense of Explicit Prior
3	Permission under Section 213.10.
4	SECTION 213.7. OFFENSIVE SEXUAL CONTACT BY PHYSICAL FORCE OR RESTRAINT OR BY
5	SURREPTITIOUS INCAPACITATION; OFFENSIVE SEXUAL CONTACT
6	(1) Offensive Sexual Contact by Physical Force or Restraint or by Surreptitious
7	Incapacitation. An actor is guilty of Offensive Sexual Contact by Physical Force or Restraint
8	or by Surreptitious Incapacitation when:
9	*(a) the actor knowingly engages in an act of sexual contact with another
10	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual contact; and
11	(b) the act is without effective consent because:
12	(i) the actor uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use physical
13	force or restraint against anyone, and that conduct causes the other person to
14	submit to or perform the act of sexual contact; or
15	(ii) at the time of the act of sexual contact the other person lacks
16	substantial capacity to appraise, control, or remember the person's own sexual
17	conduct or that of anyone else because of a substance administered to that
18	person, without that person's knowledge or consent; and the actor
19	administered the incapacitating substance for the purpose of causing that
20	incapacity or knows that it was surreptitiously administered by another for that
21	purpose; and
22	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
23	and results specified in paragraph (b).
24	Offensive Sexual Contact by Physical Force or Restraint or by Surreptitious
25	Incapacitation is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum].
26	(2) Offensive Sexual Contact. An actor is guilty of Offensive Sexual Contact when:
27	*(a) the actor knowingly engages in an act of sexual contact with another
28	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual contact; and

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1	*(b) the other person did not consent to that act, and the actor is reckless with
2	respect to the lack of consent; or
3	(c) the act is without effective consent because:
4	*(i) the other person is unaware that such act is occurring, or is
5	physically unable to communicate lack of consent at the time of the act, and
6	the actor is reckless with respect to whether the other person is in that
7	condition at the time of the act; or
8	(ii) the act would be an offense as defined by Section 213.3(2) or (3),
9	involving vulnerable or legally restricted persons, had the act been one of
10	sexual penetration or oral sex; or
11	(iii) the act would be an offense as defined by Section 213.4, involving
12	extortion, had the act been one of sexual penetration or oral sex; or
13	(iv) the act would be an offense as defined by Section 213.5, involving
14	prohibited deception, had the act been one of sexual penetration or oral sex.
15	Offensive Sexual Contact is a petty misdemeanor [six-month maximum].
16	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
17	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual contact in a circumstance described
18	in subsections (1)(b) or (2)(c). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that would
19	otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring in a
20	circumstance described in those subsections. If applicable, an actor charged with a violation
21	of subsections (1)(b)(i), (2)(b), or (2)(c)(iii) may raise an affirmative defense of Explicit Prior
22	Permission under Section 213.10.
23	SECTION 213.8. SEXUAL OFFENSES INVOLVING MINORS
24	(1) Sexual Assault of a Minor. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault of a Minor when:
25	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
26	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
27	or oral sex; and
28	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
29	(i) the other person is younger than 16; and

1	(ii) the actor is more than five years older than the other person; and
2	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
3	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
4	*Sexual Assault of a Minor is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum] except
5	that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum] when at the time of the act the
6	actor is 21 or older, and it is a felony of the third degree [10-year maximum] and a registrable
7	offense when at the time of the act the actor is 21 or older, the other person is younger than
8	12, and the actor is reckless with respect to whether the other person is younger than 12.
9	(2) Incestuous Sexual Assault of a Minor. An actor is guilty of Incestuous Sexual
10	Assault of a Minor when:
11	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
12	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
13	or oral sex; and
14	(b) at the time of the act, the actor is 18 or older and the other person is
15	younger than 18; and
16	(c) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act the actor
17	is:
18	(i) a parent or grandparent of the other person, including a biological,
19	step, adoptive, or foster parent or grandparent; or
20	(ii) the legal spouse, domestic partner, or sexual partner of a person
21	described by subparagraph (i); or
22	(iii) a legal guardian or de facto parent of the other person, who resides
23	intermittently or permanently in the same dwelling as the other person; and
24	*(d) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
25	and results specified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c).
26	Incestuous Sexual Assault of a Minor is a felony of the third degree [10-year
27	maximum]. It is a registrable offense when at the time of the act the other person is younger
28	than 16.
29	(3) Exploitative Sexual Assault of a Minor. An actor is guilty of Exploitative Sexual
30	Assault of a Minor when:

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1	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
2	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
3	or oral sex; and
4	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
5	(i) the other person is younger than 18; and
6	(ii) the actor is more than five years older than the other person; and
7	(iii) the actor holds over the other person a formal position of authority,
8	such as a teacher, employer, religious leader, treatment provider,
9	administrator, or coach; and
10	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances,
11	and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b).
12	Exploitative Sexual Assault of a Minor is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year
13	maximum]. It is a defense to a prosecution under Section 213.8(3) for the actor to prove by a
14	preponderance of the evidence that the actor's position of authority over the other person
15	did not impair the other person's ability to form an independent judgment about whether to
16	consent to the act of sexual penetration or oral sex.
17	(4) Fondling a Minor. An actor is guilty of Fondling a Minor when:
18	(a) the actor knowingly fondles another person, or knowingly causes another
19	person to submit to or perform an act of fondling; and
20	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
21	(i) the other person is younger than 12 and the actor is more than five
22	years older than the other person; or
23	(ii) the other person is younger than 16 and the actor is more than seven
24	years older than the other person; and
25	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the attendant circumstances described
26	in paragraph (b)(i) or (ii).
27	*Grading. Fondling a Minor is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum],
28	except that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum] when at the time of the act
29	the actor is 21 or older, the other person is younger than 12, and the actor is reckless with
30	respect to whether the other person is younger than 12.

1	(5) Aggravated Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor. An actor is guilty of Aggravated
2	Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor when:
3	(a) the actor knowingly engages in an act of sexual contact with another person
4	or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual contact; and
5	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
6	(i) the other person is younger than 18; and
7	(ii) the actor is more than five years older than the other person; and
8	(iii) the act, had it been an act of sexual penetration or oral sex, would
9	be an offense as defined by Section 213.1, 213.2, 213.3, 213.4, 213.5, or 213.8(2)
10	or (3); and
11	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the attendant circumstances described
12	in paragraph (b)(i) and (ii).
13	Aggravated Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor is a felony of the fourth degree
14	[five-year maximum].
15	(6) Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor. An actor is guilty of Offensive Sexual
16	Contact with a Minor when:
17	*(a) the actor knowingly engages with another person in, or causes another
18	person to submit to or perform:
19	(i) an act of sexual contact; or
20	(ii) an act involving the touching of the tongue of anyone to any body
21	part or object, when that act is for the purpose of anyone's sexual arousal,
22	sexual gratification, sexual humiliation, or sexual degradation; and
23	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
24	(i) the other person is younger than 12, and the actor is more than five
25	years older than the other person; or
26	(ii) the other person is younger than 16, and the actor is more than
27	seven years older than the other person; and
28	*(c) the actor is reckless with respect to the attendant circumstances described
29	in paragraph (b)(i) or (ii).
30	*Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor is a misdemeanor [one-year maximum],
31	except that it is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum] when at the time of the act

1	the actor is 21 or older, the other person is younger than 12, and the actor is reckless with
2	respect to whether the other person is younger than 12.
3	(7) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
4	circumstances described in any of the subsections (1) through (6) exist at the time of the act.
5	Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not
6	constitute effective consent when occurring in the circumstances described in any of those
7	subsections.
8	(8) Calculation of ages. The age of any person described in this Section is calculated
9	according to the "days-and-month" approach, which determines age by the day, month, and
10	year of that person's birth, measured in whole numbers.
11	[(9) Affirmative defense of marriage. It is an affirmative defense to a charge under
12	subsections (1), (3), (4), and (6) of this Section, and to a charge under subsection (5)(b) based
13	on an act that would be a violation of subsection (3) had it been an act of sexual penetration
14	or oral sex, that the actor was the legal spouse of the other person at the time of the act of
15	sexual penetration, oral sex, fondling, or sexual contact.]
16	*(10) In a juvenile court proceeding to adjudicate delinquency on the basis of conduct
17	that would constitute an offense under this Section, an actor younger than 14 may be
18	adjudicated delinquent only as a misdemeanant, regardless of the penalty authorized for that
19	conduct when it constitutes an offense under this Section.
20	SECTION 213.9. SEX TRAFFICKING
21	(1) Sex Trafficking. An actor is guilty of Sex Trafficking if the actor knowingly
22	recruits, entices, transports, transfers, harbors, provides, isolates, or maintains a person by
23	any means, with the purpose of facilitating a commercial sex act involving that person when:
24	(a) coercion is being, or will be, used to cause the person to submit to or
25	perform a commercial sex act, which therefore will be without effective consent; and
26	the actor knows that coercion is being or will be used to cause the person to submit to
27	or perform that commercial sex act; or

*(b) the person is younger than 18 and is being, or will be, caused to submit to

or perform a commercial sex act; and the actor is reckless with respect to whether the

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Section 213.9. Sex Trafficking

1	person is younger than 18 and is being, or will be, caused to submit to or perform the
2	commercial sex act.
3	(2) Definitions. For purposes of Section 213.9(1):
4	(a) "Coercion" means:
5	(i) using or threatening to use physical force or restraint against
6	anyone;
7	(ii) taking, destroying, or threatening to take or destroy the person's
8	money, credit or debit card, passport, driver's license, immigration document,
9	or other government-issued identification document, including a document
10	issued by a foreign government, or any travel document pertaining to the
11	person;
12	(iii) restricting or threatening to restrict the person's access to a
13	substance that is a controlled substance under the federal Controlled
14	Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.;
15	(iv) administering or withholding a controlled substance in
16	circumstances that impair the person's physical or mental ability to avoid,
17	evade, or flee from the actor;
18	(v) using a scheme, plan, deception, misrepresentation, or pattern of
19	behavior for the purpose of causing the person to believe that failing to submit
20	to or perform a commercial sex act would result in physical, psychological,
21	financial, or reputational harm to anyone that is sufficiently serious to cause
22	someone of ordinary resolution, who is of the same background, in the same
23	circumstances, and in the same physical and mental condition as that person,
24	to submit to or perform a commercial sex act in order to avoid incurring that
25	harm; or
26	(vi) any combination of these circumstances.
27	(b) "Commercial Sex Act" means any act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or
28	sexual contact performed in exchange, or the expectation of exchange, for money,
29	property, services, or any other thing of value given to or received by anyone.
30	(3) Grading. Sex Trafficking is a felony of the third degree [10-year maximum].

1	(4) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when a
2	circumstance described in subsection (1) is present. Submission, acquiescence, or words or
3	conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when
4	occurring under a circumstance described in that subsection. If applicable, the actor may
5	raise an affirmative defense of Explicit Prior Permission under Section 213.10 when:
6	(a) a charge of Sex Trafficking is based on coercion under subsection (1)(a);
7	and
8	(b) the person giving such permission does so before that person has been
9	subjected to trafficking under subsection (1) and before that person has been
10	subjected to coercion under subsection (1)(a).
11	SECTION 213.10. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF EXPLICIT PRIOR PERMISSION
12	(1) Except as provided in subsection (3), it is an affirmative defense to a charge under
13	this Article that the actor reasonably believed that, in connection with the charged act of
14	sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact, the other party personally gave the actor
15	explicit prior permission to use or threaten to use physical force or restraint, or to inflict or
16	threaten to inflict any harm otherwise proscribed by Sections 213.1, 213.2, 213.4, 213.7, or
17	213.9, or to ignore the absence of consent otherwise proscribed by Section 213.6.
18	*(2) Permission is "explicit" under subsection (1) only when it is given orally or by
19	written agreement:
20	(a) specifying that the actor may ignore the other party's expressions of
21	unwillingness or other absence of consent;
22	(b) identifying the specific forms and extent of force, restraint, or threats that
23	are permitted; and
24	(c) stipulating the specific words or gestures that will withdraw the permission.
25	Permission given by gestures or other nonverbal conduct signaling assent is not
26	"explicit" under subsection (1).

(3) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable when:

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1	*(a) the act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact occurs after the
2	explicit permission was withdrawn, and the actor is reckless with respect to whether
3	the permission was withdrawn;
4	(b) the actor relies on permission to use force or restraint or ignore the absence
5	of consent at a time when the other party will be unconscious, asleep, or otherwise
6	unable to withdraw that permission;
7	*(c) the actor recklessly engages in conduct that causes or risks serious bodily
8	injury; or
9	*(d) at the time explicit permission is given, the other party is, and the actor is
10	reckless with respect to whether the other party is:
11	(i) younger than 18;
12	(ii) giving that permission while subjected to physical force or restraint;
13	(iii) giving that permission because of the use of or threat to use physical
14	force or restraint, or extortion as defined by Section 213.4, if that party does
15	not give the permission;
16	(iv) lacking substantial capacity to appraise or control that party's
17	conduct as a result of intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, and
18	regardless of the identity of the person who administered the intoxicants;
19	(v) incapacitated, vulnerable, or legally restricted, as defined by Section
20	213.3;
21	(vi) subject to prohibited deception, as defined by Section 213.5; or
22	(vii) subject to trafficking, as defined by Section 213.9(1).
23	SECTION 213.11. SENTENCING AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
23 24	(1) Definitions. For purposes of this Article:
25	(a) "sentencing consequences" are penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages that
26	are part of the sentence imposed by the court or by an agency authorized to set the
27	
28	terms of parole or post-release supervision in connection with conviction of an Article 213 offense; and
28 29	(b) "collateral consequences" are penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages,
49	(b) conateral consequences are penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages,

I	however denominated, that are authorized or required by federal, state, or local law
2	as a direct result of an individual's conviction of an Article 213 offense but are not
3	part of the sentence imposed by the court or by an agency authorized to set the terms
4	of parole or post-release supervision in connection with that conviction.
5	(2) General Rule. Sentencing procedure, the authorized disposition of a person
6	convicted of an Article 213 offense, sentencing consequences, and collateral consequences are
7	specified in Articles 6 and 7 of this Code,* and are subject to the additional requirements of
8	this Section.
9	(3) Additional Requirements for Sentencing Consequences. Notwithstanding any
10	contrary provisions of law, the conditions of any suspended sentence under Section 6.02(2),
11	any sentence to probation under Section 6.05, and any terms of parole or post-release
12	supervision under Section 6.13 must be eligible for early relief under Section 213.11J and
13	must not include:
14	(a) a condition that:
15	(i) imposes an obligation to register with law enforcement that carries
16	requirements other than those authorized under Sections 213.11A-213.11G
17	and Section 213.11J;
18	(ii) permits access to the person's registry information, except as
19	authorized under Section 213.11H; or
20	(iii) authorizes or permits any government official to notify a public or
21	private entity or individual, other than a government law-enforcement agency
22	or individual, that the person is registered with law enforcement or resides,
23	works, or studies in the locality;
24	(b) a condition that restricts the person's occupation or employment, except as
25	required by state law or authorized under paragraph (d) of this subsection; or
26	(c) except as authorized under paragraph (d) of this subsection, a condition
27	that:
28	(i) requires the person to submit to GPS monitoring; or
29	(ii) restricts the person's education, Internet access, or place of
30	residence.

^{*} Model Penal Code: Sentencing, *Official Statutory Text* (May 24, 2017).

1	(d) The court, and any agency authorized to set the terms of parole or post-
2	release supervision, may impose a condition, not required by state law, that restricts
3	the person's occupation or employment, or a condition specified in paragraph (c) of
4	this subsection, only if the court or agency determines that the condition is manifestly
5	required in the interest of public safety. That determination must be:
6	(i) made after due consideration of the nature of the offense; all other
7	circumstances of the case; the person's prior record; and the potential
8	negative impacts of the burden, restriction, requirement, or government
9	action on the person, on the person's family, and on the person's prospects for
10	rehabilitation and reintegration into society; and
11	(ii) accompanied by a written statement of the official setting the
12	condition, explaining the need for it, the evidentiary basis for the finding of
13	need, and the reasons why a more narrowly drawn condition would not
14	adequately meet that need.
15	(e) Any condition imposed under paragraph (d) must be:
16	(i) drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the goal of public safety;
17	and
18	(ii) imposed only for a period not to exceed that permitted under
19	Section 213.11F for the duties to register and keep the registration current.
20	(4) Additional Requirements for Collateral Consequences that are Applicable Primarily
21	to Persons Convicted of a Sexual Offense. Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law,
22	collateral consequences applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense,
23	including the obligation to register with law enforcement; associated duties; restrictions on
24	occupation and employment, education, and place of residence applicable primarily to
25	persons convicted of a sexual offense; and other collateral consequences applicable primarily
26	to persons convicted of a sexual offense, are authorized and their scope and implementation
27	are delineated as follows:
28	(a) The person's obligation to register for law-enforcement purposes is
29	governed by Section 213.11A.
30	(b) Notification of the person's obligation to register and associated duties
31	is governed by Section 213.11B.

1	(c) The time of initial registration is governed by Section 213.11C.
2	(d) The information required upon registration is specified in Section
3	213.11D.
4	(e) The duty to keep registration current is specified in Section 213.11E.
5	(f) The duration of the registration requirements is specified in Section
6	213.11F.
7	(g) Penalties for failure to register are governed by Section 213.11G.
8	(h) Access to registry information is governed by Section 213.11H.
9	(i) Collateral consequences applicable primarily to persons convicted of a
10	sexual offense, other than the obligation to register for law-enforcement purposes
11	and restrictions on occupation and employment required by state law, are
12	governed by Section 213.11I.
13	(j) Standards and procedures for relief from the obligation to register,
14	associated duties, and other collateral consequences applicable specifically to
15	persons convicted of a sexual offense are governed by Section 213.11J.
16	*(5) Retroactive Effect. As of the effective date of this Section, all prior registration
17	requirements and other collateral consequences applicable primarily to persons convicted of
18	a sexual offense, whether imposed by this or any other jurisdiction, are subject to the
19	requirements and limits of this Section and Sections 213.11A-J.
20	SECTION 213.11A. REGISTRATION FOR LAW-ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
21	(1) Convictions in This Jurisdiction
22	(a) Except as provided in subsection (3), every person convicted of an offense
23	that is designated a registrable offense in this Article must, in addition to any other
24	sanction imposed upon conviction, appear personally and register, at the time
25	specified in Section 213.11C, with the law-enforcement authority designated by law
26	in the [county] where the person resides. If the person who is required to register
27	under this subsection does not reside in this jurisdiction, but works in this
28	jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person

works; if the person does not reside or work in this jurisdiction but is enrolled in a

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program of study in this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person studies.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no conviction for an offense under this Article, or for any other criminal offense in this jurisdiction, will require the person convicted to register with law enforcement or other governmental authority in a registry regime applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense, unless this Article designates that offense as a registrable offense.

(2) Convictions in Other Jurisdictions

- (a) Duty to register and related duties. Every person currently obliged to register with law enforcement or other pubic authority in another jurisdiction, because of a sexual-offense conviction in that jurisdiction, who subsequently resides, works, or enrolls in a program of study in this jurisdiction, must register with the law-enforcement authority designated by law and comply with the requirements of Sections 213.11A-213.11G, provided that the conviction offense in the other jurisdiction is comparable to an offense that would be registrable under this Article if committed in this jurisdiction.
- (b) *Place of registration*. If the person who is obliged to register under paragraph (a) resides in this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person resides. If the person who is obliged to register under paragraph (a) does not reside in this jurisdiction, but works in this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person works; if the person does not reside or work in this jurisdiction but is enrolled in a program of study this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person studies.

(c) Determining the comparability of conviction offenses in other jurisdictions

(i) Standard. A conviction offense in another jurisdiction is comparable to a registrable offense under this Article if and only if the elements of the other jurisdiction's offense are no broader than the elements of that registrable offense. When, regardless of the conduct underlying the other jurisdiction's conviction, the other jurisdiction's offense can be committed by conduct that is not sufficient to establish a registrable offense under this

1	Article, the two offenses are not comparable.
2	(ii) Procedure. Before determining that a conviction offense in another
3	jurisdiction is comparable to a registrable offense under this Article, the
4	authority designated to make that determination must give the person
5	concerned notice and an opportunity to be heard on that question, either orally
6	or in writing.
7	(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no conviction for a sexual
8	offense in another jurisdiction will require the offender to register with law
9	enforcement or other governmental authority in this jurisdiction, unless that
10	conviction currently requires the offender to register with law enforcement or other
11	governmental authority in that jurisdiction and the conviction is for an offense
12	comparable to an offense that would be registrable under this Article if committed in
13	this jurisdiction.
14	(3) Persons Under the Age of 18. No person may be subject to the obligation to register
15	under subsection (1) of this Section, to other obligations or restrictions under this Section, or
16	to additional collateral consequences under Section 213.11I, on the basis of a criminal
17	conviction for an offense committed when the person was under the age of 18, or on the basis
18	of an adjudication of delinquency based on conduct when the person was under the age of
19	18; provided, however, that this subsection (3) does not apply to a person convicted of a
20	criminal offense of Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint if the person
21	was at least 16 years old at the time of that offense.
22	SECTION 213.11B. NOTIFICATION OF THE OBLIGATION TO REGISTER AND ASSOCIATED
23	Duties
24	(1) Before accepting a guilty plea, and at the time of sentencing after conviction on a
25	guilty plea or at trial, the sentencing judge must:
26	(a) inform the person who is subject to registration of the registration
27	requirement;
28	(b) explain the associated duties, including:
29	(i) the identity and location, or procedure for determining the identity

1	and location, of the law-enforcement agency where the person must appear to
2	register as required by Section 213.11A;
3	(ii) the duty to register with a law-enforcement agency in any locality
4	where the person subsequently resides, including the possible duty to register
5	with a law-enforcement agency or other government authority in another
6	jurisdiction to which the person subsequently moves;
7	(iii) the duty to report to that office or agency periodically in person, as
8	required by Section 213.11E(1); and
9	(iv) the duty to promptly notify at least one of the local jurisdictions
10	where the person is registered of any change in the registry information
11	pertaining to that person, as required by Section 213.11E(2);
12	(c) notify the person of the right to petition for relief from those duties as
13	provided in Section 213.11J;
14	(d) confirm that defense counsel has explained to that person those duties and
15	the right to petition for relief from those duties;
16	(e) confirm that the person understands those duties and that right;
17	(f) require the person to read and sign a form stating that defense counsel and
18	the sentencing judge have explained the applicable duties and the right to petition for
19	relief from those duties, and that the person understands those duties and that right;
20	(g) ensure that if the person convicted of a sexual offense cannot read or
21	understand the language in which the form is written, the person will be informed of
22	the pertinent information by other suitable means that the jurisdiction uses to
23	communicate with such individuals; and
24	(h) satisfy all other notification requirements applicable under Model Penal
25	Code: Sentencing, Section 7.04(1).
26	(2) At the time of sentencing, the convicted person shall receive a copy of the form
27	signed pursuant to subsection (1)(f) of this Section.
28	(3) If the convicted person is sentenced to a custodial sanction, an appropriate official
29	must, shortly before the person's release from custody, again inform the person of the
30	registration requirement, explain the associated rights and duties, including the right to
31	petition for relief from those duties, and require the person to read and sign a form stating

that those rights and duties have been explained and that the person understands those rights

2	and duties. At the time of release from custody, the person concerned shall receive a copy of
3	that form.
4	SECTION 213.11C. TIME OF INITIAL REGISTRATION
5	A person subject to registration must initially register:
6	(a) if incarcerated after sentence is imposed, then within three business days
7	after release; or
8	(b) if not incarcerated after sentence is imposed, then not later than five
9	business days after being sentenced for the offense giving rise to the duty of
10	registration.
11	SECTION 213.11D. INFORMATION REQUIRED IN REGISTRATION
12	(1) A person subject to registration under Section 213.11A must provide the following
13	information to the appropriate official for inclusion in the law-enforcement registry:
14	(a) the name of the person (including any alias used by the person);
15	(b) the Social Security number, if any, of the person;
16	(c) the address of each place where the person resides or expects to reside;
17	(d) the name and address of any place where the person works or expects to
18	work;
19	(e) the name and address of any place where the person is a student or expects
20	to be a student;
21	(f) the license-plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or
22	regularly operated by the person.
23	(2) Supplementary Information. The local jurisdiction in which a person registers must
24	ensure that the following information is included in the registry for that person and kept up
25	to date:
26	(a) the text of the provision of law defining the sexual offense for which the
27	person is registered;

1	(b) the person's criminal history, including the date and offense designation of
2	all convictions; and the person's parole, probation, or supervised-release status;
3	(c) any other information required by law.
4	(3) Registrants Who Lack a Stable Residential Address. If a person required to register
5	lacks a stable residential address, the person must, at the time of registration, report with as
6	much specificity as possible the principal place where the person sleeps, instead of the
7	information required under subsection (1)(c).
8	(4) The local jurisdiction in which a person registers must promptly provide the
9	information specified in subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this Section to an appropriate law-
10	enforcement authority in every other jurisdiction in which the registrant works or expects
11	to work and is enrolled or expects to enroll in a program of study.
12	(5) Correction of Errors. Each locality where a person registers and each locality that
13	receives information about a registrant pursuant to subsection (4) of this Section must
14	provide efficacious, reasonably accessible procedures for correcting erroneous registry
15	information. Each locality where a person registers must, at the time of registration, provide
16	the registrant instructions on how to use those procedures to seek correction of registry
17	information that the registrant believes to be erroneous.
18	SECTION 213.11E. DUTY TO KEEP REGISTRATION CURRENT
19	*(1) Annual Updates
20	(a) A person who is required to register under Section 213.11A must, not less
21	frequently than once every year, appear in person in the jurisdiction where the person is
22	required to register under Section 213.11A, verify the current accuracy of the information
23	provided in compliance with Section 213.11D(1), allow the jurisdiction to take a current
24	photograph, and report any change in the identity of other jurisdictions in which the person
25	is required to register or in which the person works or is enrolled in a program of study.
26	*(b) Not less than 30 nor more than 45 days before the person's annual registration
27	date, the authority where the person is registered under Section 213.11A must alert the

registrant to the requirements of this Section by sending written notice to the person's

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residential address.

1	*(c) In the case of registrants who lack a stable residential address, and therefore
2	report instead the principal place or places where they sleep, as provided in Section
3	213.11D(3), the authority where the person is registered under Section 213.11A must make
4	a good-faith effort to provide this written notice to the person at the location the person has
5	reported as the principal place where the person sleeps.
6	(2) Change of Circumstances
7	(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person subject to
8	registration under Section 213.11A must, not later than five business days after each
9	change of name and each change in the location where the person resides, works, or
10	is enrolled in a program of study, notify the local jurisdiction specified in Section
11	213.11A of:
12	(i) all changes in the information that the person is required to provide
13	under Section 213.11D, and
14	(ii) the identity of all other jurisdictions in which the person resides,
15	works, or is enrolled in a program of study.
16	(b) Registrants who lack a stable residential address, and therefore report
17	instead the principal place or places where they sleep, as provided in Section
18	213.11D(3), must confirm or update those locations once every 90 days but need not
19	do so more often.
20	(c) Each jurisdiction that maintains a registry of persons who have been
21	convicted of a sexual offense must permit registrants to notify the jurisdiction, by one
22	or more reliable, readily accessible methods of communication of the jurisdiction's
23	choosing, such as U.S. mail, submission of an appropriate form online, or otherwise,
24	of any change of name, residence, employment, student status, or vehicle regularly
25	used, and any change in the identity of all other jurisdictions in which the person
26	resides, works, or is enrolled in a program of study.
27	*(d) Each jurisdiction where a person registers pursuant to Section 213.11A
28	must advise the registrant, at the time of registration, of the registrant's option to use
29	the means of communication established under subsection (2)(c), rather than
30	appearing personally for that purpose, if the registrant so chooses, other than for the
31	annual in-person meeting requirement of subsection (1).

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(3) The local jurisdiction notified of any changes pursuant to subsections (1) and (2)

2	must promptly provide the registrant a written receipt confirming that the updated
3	information has been provided, and must provide that information to all other jurisdictions
4	in which the person resides, works, or is enrolled in a program of study.
5	SECTION 213.11F. DURATION OF REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT
6	(1) Ordinary Termination
7	(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this Section and Section
8	213.11J, a person required to register must keep the registration current for a period
9	of 15 years, beginning on the date when the registrant is released from custody after
10	conviction for the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or if the
11	registrant is not sentenced to a term of incarceration, beginning on the date when the
12	registrant was sentenced for that offense.
13	*(b) At the expiration of that 15-year period, the duty to keep that registration
14	current will terminate, and the person who had been registered will not be subject to
15	any further duties associated with that registration requirement. The person will
16	remain subject to any registration requirement that arises from conviction of any
17	other sexual offense.
18	*(c) In determining whether the 15-year period has been completed, that
19	period shall include any time in which the person was registered, prior to the effective
20	date of Sections 213.11 and 213.11A-J, for the offense giving rise to that registration
21	requirement.
22	(2) Early Termination. If, during the first 10 years of the period during which a person
23	is required to keep registration information current, the person:
24	(a) successfully completes any period of supervised release, probation, or
25	parole, and satisfies any financial obligation such as a fine or restitution, other than
26	a financial obligation that the person, despite good-faith effort, has been unable to
27	pay; and
28	(b) successfully completes any required sexual-offense treatment program;
29	and

1	(c) is not convicted of, or facing pending charges for, any subsequent offense
2	under this Article, or any subsequent sexual offense in another jurisdiction that would
3	be an offense under this Article if committed in this jurisdiction; then:
4	the duty to keep that registry information current will terminate; the person who had
5	been registered will not be subject to any further duties associated with that registration
6	requirement; and subsequent access to registry information will be governed by subsection
7	(3).
8	(3) Access to Registry Information After Termination. When the person's obligation to
9	register and to keep registry information current terminates under subsection (1) or (2),
10	subsequent access to registry information is limited as follows:
11	(a) Registry information recorded as of the date when termination takes effect
12	may remain available to any government law-enforcement agency seeking disclosure
13	of that information in compliance with Section 213.11H(1)(a).
14	(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a), no public or private agency may
15	thereafter be permitted access to registry information associated with a registration
16	requirement that has terminated.
17	(4) Notice of Termination. When a person's duty to register terminates under
18	subsection (1) or (2), the law-enforcement agency in the local jurisdiction where the person
19	resides must:
20	(a) include in its registry a notice that the person's duty to register and all
21	duties associated with that registration requirement have terminated; and
22	(b) upon the person's request, notify all other jurisdictions where the person
23	is registered and where information about the registrant has been provided pursuant
24	to Section 213.11D(4) that the person's duty to register and all duties associated with
25	that registration requirement have terminated and that no public or private agency
26	other than a government law-enforcement agency shall thereafter be permitted to
27	have access to that registry information.
28	(5) Certification. When a person's duty to register terminates under subsection (1) or
29	(2), the law-enforcement agency in the local jurisdiction where the person resides must, upon
30	request, provide that person a certificate attesting that person's duty to register and all duties
31	associated with that registration requirement have terminated.

1	SECTION 213.11G. FAILURE TO REGISTER
2	(1) Offense of Failure to Register. A person required to register under Section 213.11A
3	is guilty of Failure to Register, a misdemeanor, if that person knowingly fails to register as
4	required by Sections 213.11A, 213.11C, 213.11D, and 213.11E(1), or knowingly fails to
5	update a registration as required by Section 213.11E(2).
6	(2) Affirmative Defense. In a prosecution for Failure to Register under subsection (1)
7	of this Section, it is an affirmative defense that:
8	(a) circumstances beyond the control of the accused prevented the accused
9	from complying;
10	*(b) the accused did not recklessly contribute to the creation of those
11	circumstances; and
12	(c) after those circumstances ceased to exist, the accused complied as soon as
13	reasonably feasible.
14	*(3) Other Consequences of Not Meeting Registration Requirements. Failing to register
15	or to meet other registration requirements may not be a basis for revoking bail, probation,
16	parole, or other conditions of release from custody, unless the person who failed to do so has
17	been convicted under this Section of the offense of Failure to Register.
18	SECTION 213.11H. ACCESS TO REGISTRY INFORMATION
19	(1) Confidentiality
20	(a) Each law-enforcement agency with which a person is registered and each
21	law-enforcement agency that receives information about a registrant pursuant to
22	Section 213.11D(4) must exercise due diligence to ensure that all information about
23	the registrant remains confidential, except that relevant information about a specific
24	registrant must be made available to any government law-enforcement agency that
25	requests information to aid in the investigation of a specific criminal offense.
26	(b) Any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (a) must include a warning that:
27	(i) the law-enforcement agency receiving the information must exercise
28	due diligence to ensure that the information remains confidential;
29	(ii) such information may be disclosed and used as provided in

1	paragraph (a), but otherwise must not be disclosed to any person or public or
2	private agency;
3	(iii) such information may be used only for the purpose requested;
4	(iv) such information may not be used to injure, harass, or commit a
5	crime against the registrant or anyone else; and
6	(v) any failure to comply with the confidentiality and use-limitation
7	requirements of paragraph (b) could result in civil or criminal penalties.
8	(2) Unauthorized Disclosure of Registry Information. An actor is guilty of
9	Unauthorized Disclosure of Registry Information if:
10	(a) the actor, having received registry information as provided in subsection
11	(1), knowingly or recklessly discloses that information, or permits that information to
12	be disclosed, to any person not authorized to receive it; or
13	(b) the actor obtains access to registry information by computer trespassing or
14	otherwise in violation of law and subsequently knowingly or recklessly discloses that
15	information, or permits that information to be disclosed, to any other person.
16	Unauthorized Disclosure of Registry Information is a felony of the fourth degree [five-
17	year maximum].

SECTION 213.11I. ADDITIONAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION

*(1) Definition. For purposes of this Section, the term "additional collateral consequence" means any collateral consequence, as defined in Section 213.11(1)(b), that is applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense, other than the obligation to register with law enforcement specified in Section 213.11A, the associated duties and restrictions specified in Sections 213.11C-213.11G, and any restriction on occupation or employment required by state law. These additional collateral consequences include any government-imposed program or restriction applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense that restricts the convicted person's occupation or employment except as required by state law; limits the convicted person's education, Internet access, or place of residence; uses methods such as GPS monitoring to track the person's movements; notifies a community organization or entity or a private party that the person resides, works, or

- studies in the locality; or permits a public or private agency, organization, or person to access registry information, except as authorized by Section 213.11H. An "additional collateral consequence" under this Section does not include a collateral consequence that applies to persons convicted of many different offenses, such as any government-imposed limits on jury service, access to public benefits, and other government-imposed penalties, disabilities, and disadvantages that result from conviction of a wide variety of offenses, including but not limited to sexual offenses.
- (2) Additional Collateral Consequences Precluded for Persons Not Required to Register. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an additional collateral consequence, as defined in subsection (1), unless that person has been convicted of a registrable offense and is required to register with law enforcement under Section 213.11A.
- (3) Additional Collateral Consequences Precluded for Persons Required to Register. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person required to register with law enforcement under Section 213.11A must not be subject to any government action notifying a community organization or entity or a private party that the person resides, works, or studies in the locality; and must not be subject to any government action permitting a public or private agency, organization, or person to access registry information, except as authorized by Section 213.11H.
- (4) Additional Collateral Consequences Available for Persons Required to Register. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person required to register with law enforcement under Section 213.11A may be subject to an additional collateral consequence not specified in subsection (3), but only if an official designated by law, after affording the person notice and an opportunity to respond concerning the proposed additional collateral consequence, determines that the additional collateral consequence is manifestly required in the interest of public safety, after due consideration of:
 - (a) the nature of the offense;
 - (b) all other circumstances of the case;
 - (c) the person's prior record; and
 - (d) the potential negative impacts of the burden, restriction, requirement, or government action on the person, on the person's family, and on the person's prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

1	(5) Limitations. The designated official who approves any additional collateral
2	consequence pursuant to subsection (4) of this Section must determine that the additional
3	collateral consequence:
4	(a) satisfies all applicable notification requirements set forth in Section
5	213.11B;
6	(b) is authorized by law;
7	(c) is drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the goal of public safety;
8	(d) is accompanied by a written statement of the official approving the
9	additional collateral consequence, explaining the need for it, the evidentiary basis for
10	the finding of need, and the reasons why a more narrowly drawn restriction,
11	disability, or government action would not adequately meet that need; and
12	(e) is imposed only for a period not to exceed that permitted under Section
13	213.11F for the duties to register and keep the registration current.
14	(6) Confidentiality. In any proceeding under subsection (4) to consider whether to
15	impose an additional collateral consequence, the official responsible for making the
16	determination must insure that the identity of the registrant concerned remains confidential.
17	*(7) Judicial Review. A person on whom an additional collateral consequence has been
18	imposed under subsections (4) and (5) is entitled to judicial review in an appropriate court,
19	within the time and in accordance with the procedures provided by law for review of
20	decisions of administrative agencies in this jurisdiction.
21	SECTION 213.11J. DISCRETIONARY RELIEF FROM REGISTRATION AND OTHER SENTENCING
22	CONSEQUENCES AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
23	(1) Petition for Discretionary Relief. At any time prior to the expiration of any
24	sentencing consequences imposed under Section 213.11(3) or any collateral consequences
25	applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense, including the obligation to
26	register, the obligation to comply with associated duties, restrictions on occupation or
27	employment required by state law, collateral consequences imposed under Section 213.11(4),
28	and additional collateral consequences imposed under Section 213.11I(4), the registrant may

petition the sentencing court, or other authority authorized by law, to order relief from all

or part of those consequences. If the obligation to register or other consequences arose from an out-of-state conviction, the petition may be addressed to a court of general jurisdiction or other authority of this state in the place where the person concerned is registered.

- (2) Proceedings on Petition for Discretionary Relief. The authority to which the petition is addressed may either dismiss the petition summarily, in whole or in part, or institute proceedings to rule on the merits of the petition. If that authority chooses to entertain submissions, hear argument, or take evidence prior to ruling on the merits of the petition, it must give notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to participate in it to the prosecuting attorney for the offense out of which the obligation to register or other consequence arose. If the obligation to register or other consequence arose from an out-of-state conviction, notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to participate in it must be addressed to the principal prosecuting attorney in the jurisdiction of this state where the authority to which the petition is addressed is located.
- (3) Judgment on Proceedings for Discretionary Relief. Following proceedings for discretionary relief under subsection (2), the authority to which the petition is addressed may grant or deny relief, in whole or in part, from the obligation to register, any associated duties, and any of the sentencing consequences or collateral consequences in question. When that order terminates the registrant's obligation to register and to keep registry information current, subsequent disclosure of registry information is governed by subsection (5) of this Section. An order granting or denying relief following those proceedings must explain in writing the reasons for granting or denying relief.
- (4) Standard for Discretionary Relief. The authority to which the petition is addressed must grant relief if it finds, after proceedings to rule on the merits pursuant to subsection (2), that the sentencing consequence or collateral consequence in question is likely to impose a substantial burden on the registrant's ability to reintegrate into law-abiding society, and that public-safety considerations do not require continued imposition of the obligation, duty, or consequence after due consideration of:
 - (a) the nature of the offense;
 - (b) all other circumstances of the case;
- 30 (c) the registrant's prior and subsequent record of criminal convictions, if any;
- **and**

- (d) the potential negative impacts of the burden, restriction, or government action on the registrant, on the registrant's family, and on the registrant's prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
- Relief must not be denied arbitrarily or for any punitive purpose.

- (5) Access to Registry Information after Discretionary Relief. When an order of discretionary relief terminates the person's obligation to register and to keep registry information current, all limits on access to registry information under Section 213.11H shall remain in effect. Registry information recorded as of the date when discretionary relief takes effect must remain available to any government law-enforcement agency seeking disclosure of that information in compliance with Section 213.11H(1)(a) but must not otherwise be disclosed.
 - (6) Notice to Other Jurisdictions Concerning Discretionary Relief.
 - (a) When discretionary relief is granted to a person under this Section, the authority granting the order of relief must, upon the person's request, give notice of that order to any other jurisdiction where the person concerned is registered or where information about the person has been provided pursuant to Section 213.11D(4).
 - (b) When the other jurisdiction notified is a jurisdiction of this state, the notice must specify that the other jurisdiction must extend the same relief from registration-related duties and any other sentencing consequences or collateral consequences. When that order terminates the registrant's obligation to register and to keep registry information current, that notice must also specify the limits on subsequent disclosure of registry information applicable under subsection (5).
- (7) Proceedings Subsequent to Discretionary Relief. An order of discretionary relief granted under this Section does not preclude the authority to which the petition was addressed from later revoking that order if, on the basis of the registrant's subsequent conduct or any other substantial change in circumstances, the authority finds by a preponderance of the evidence that public-safety considerations, weighed against the burden on the registrant's ability to reintegrate into law-abiding society, no longer justify the order of relief.

- 1 (8) Confidentiality. In any proceedings under this Section to consider whether to grant
- 2 or deny discretionary relief, the official responsible for making the determination must
- 3 insure that the identity of the registrant concerned remains confidential.

Appendix A

Text of Amendments Approved at 2021 Annual Meeting

I. Ferzan-Buell Amendment to amend the "recklessly" mens rea formulations in Article 213

Amend instances where 'recklessly' is used as an adverb as follows: <(c) the actor is reckless with respect to (a) and (b) aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the circumstances described in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.>

II. Aronofsky Amendment to amend Section 213.8 (as amended during discussion)

Amend Section 213.8 to add a new subsection (10) stating: <For an offense charged under Section 213.8, an actor younger than 14 may be adjudicated delinquent only as a misdemeanant, regardless of the penalty authorized by the statute for the offense.>

III. Morrison Amendments to 213.11 (as amended during discussion)

- 1. Amend 213.11A by adding a new subsection (4): "Retroactive Effect. As of the effective date of this section, all prior registration requirements applicable to persons in this state, whether imposed by this state or any other jurisdiction, are subject to the requirements and limits of this Article."
- 2. Amend Section 213.11E(1) by adding the following at the end thereof: "The entity responsible for registration under this Article must make a good faith effort to provide notice of the requirements of this Section, sent at least 30 days before the person's annual registration date." Amend Section 213.11(E)(2)(D) by adding the following at the end thereof: "other than for the annual in person meeting requirement of Subsection (1)."
- 3. Amend 213.11F by adding a new subsection (7): "Calculating Required Years. In determining whether the 15 years in subsections (1) & (2) have been completed, any time in which the person was registered under prior registration requirements for the offense giving rise to the registration requirement shall be included in that determination."
- 4. Amend 213.11G by adding the following subsection (3): "No Collateral Consequences. The failure to register may not be the basis of a revocation of bail, probation, parole, or other similar conditions of release from confinement, unless the person who failed to register has been convicted under this Section."

Appendix A

5. Amend section 213.11I by adding the following new subsection (7): "Judicial Review. A person on whom additional collateral consequences have been imposed under this Section is entitled to judicial review in an appropriate court, within the time provided by law for review of other decisions of administrative agencies in this jurisdiction."

Black-Letter Comparison – Tentative Draft No. 5 to Council Draft No. 12

ARTICLE 213

BLACK LETTER

1	(Text marked with an asterisk indicates a change approved by the membership at the 2021Annual
2	Meeting that now requires Council approval.)
3	SECTION 213.0. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY; DEFINITIONS
4	(1) (1) This Article is governed by Part I of the 1962 Model Penal Code, including and
5	the definitions given in Section 210.0, except that:
6	(a) (a) Section 2.11 (the definition of "consent") does not apply to this article.
7	(b) (b) Subsection (2) of Section 2.08 (Intoxication) does not apply to this
8	article. Instead, the general provisions of the criminal law and rules of evidence of the
9	jurisdiction govern the materiality of the actor's intoxication in determining the
10	actor's culpability for an offense.
11	(2) (2) Definitions
12	In this Article, unless a different definition is plainly required:
13	(a) (a) "Sexual penetration" means an act involving penetration, however
14	slight, of the anus or genitalia by an object or a body part, except when done for
15	legitimate medical, hygienic, or law-enforcement purposes.*
16	(b) (b) "Oral sex" means a touching of the anus or genitalia of one person by
17	the mouth or tongue of another person.*
18	(c) (c) "Sexual contact" means any of the following acts, when the actor's
19	purpose is the sexual arousal, sexual gratification, sexual humiliation, or sexual
20	degradation of any person:
21	(i) (ii) touching the clothed or unclothed genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
22	buttocks, or inner thigh of any person with any body part or object; or
23	
24	
25	* Approved by the membership, May 2017.
26	
27	

Section 213.0. General Principles of Liability; Definitions

1	(ii) (iii) touching any body part of any person with the clothed or
2	unclothed genitalia, anus, groin, breast, buttocks, or inner thigh of any person;
3	or
4	(iii) (iii) touching any clothed or unclothed body part of any person with
5	the ejaculate of any person.
6	The touching described in paragraph (c) includes the actor touching another
7	person, another person touching the actor or a third party, or another person
8	touching that person's own body. It does not include the actor touching the actor's
9	own body.
10	(d) "Fondling" means prolonged contact with or manipulation of the genitals,
11	when the actor's purpose is the sexual arousal, sexual gratification, sexual
12	humiliation, or sexual degradation of any person. Fondling requires more than a
13	transient grope or grab. "To fondle" means to engage in fondling.
14	(e) "Consent" ***
15	(i) "Consent" for purposes of Article 213 means a person's willingness
16	to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact.
17	(ii) Consent may be express or it may be inferred from behavior—both
18	action and inaction—in the context of all the circumstances.
19	(iii) Neither verbal nor physical resistance is required to establish that
20	consent is lacking, but their absence may be considered, in the context of all
21	the circumstances, in determining the issue of consent.
22	(iv) Notwithstanding subsection (2)(e)(ii) of this Section, consent is
23	ineffective when given by a person incompetent to consent or under
24	circumstances precluding the free exercise of consent, as provided in Sections
25	213.1, 213.2, 213.3, 213.4, 213.5, 213.7, 213.8, and 213.9.
26	(v) Consent may be revoked or withdrawn any time before or during
27	the act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact. A clear verbal
28	refusal—such as "No," "Stop," or "Don't"—establishes the lack of consent or
29	the revocation or withdrawal of previous consent. Lack of consent or

^{**} Approved by the membership, May 2016.

Section 213.0. General Principles of Liability; Definitions

1	revocation or withdrawal of consent may be overridden by subsequent consent
2	given prior to the act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact.
3	(f) Force.
4	(i) (i) "Physical force or restraint" means a physical act or physical
5	restraint that inflicts more than negligible physical harm, pain, or discomfort
6	or that significantly restricts a person's ability to move freely. More than
7	negligible physical harm includes but is not limited to a burn, black eye, or
8	bloody nose, and more than negligible pain or discomfort includes but is not
9	limited to the pain or discomfort resulting from a kick, punch, or slap on the

Section 213.1. Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint

1	face.
2	(ii) (ii) "Aggravated physical force or restraint" means a physical act or
3	physical restraint that inflicts or is capable of inflicting death, serious bodily
4	injury, or extreme physical pain, or that confines another for a substantial
5	period in a place of isolation other than under color of law.
6	(g) "Actor" means a person more than 12 years old, except that "actor"
7	includes a person younger than 12 when the charge is Sexual Assault by Aggravated
8	Physical Force or Restraint (Section 213.1). "Actor" includes, where relevant, a
9	person guilty of an omission.
10	(h) "Registrable offense"
11	(i) "Registrable offense" means an offense that makes a convicted
12	person eligible for or subject to any of the collateral consequences specified in
13	Section 213.11.
14	(ii) No offense is a registrable offense under any provision of law unless
15	it is specifically so designated in this Article or is committed in another
16	jurisdiction, is a registrable offense in that jurisdiction, and would be a
17	registrable offense in this jurisdiction if it had been committed in this
18	jurisdiction.
19	SECTION 213.1. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY AGGRAVATED PHYSICAL FORCE OR RESTRAINT
20	(1) (1) Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint. An actor is guilty of
21	Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint when:
22	(a) (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
23	penetration or oral sex; and
24	(b) (b) the act is without effective consent because:
25	(i) the actor uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use aggravated
26	physical force or restraint against anyone; and
27	(ii) the actor's use of or threat to use aggravated physical force or
28	restraint causes the other person to submit to or perform the act of sexual
29	penetration or oral sex; and

Section 213.1. Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint

1	(c) (c) the actor knows that acts knowingly with respect to the conduct,
2	attendant circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are
3	present .
4	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint is a registrable
5	offense. It is a felony of the third degree [10-year maximum], except that (1) the maximum
6	term of imprisonment is five years greater than that otherwise applicable to a felony of the
7	third degree; and (2) it is a felony of the second degree [20-year maximum] if the actor violates
8	subsection (1) of this Section and in so doing:
9	(a) knowingly uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use a deadly weapon
10	and knows that this act causes the other person to submit to or perform the act of
11	sexual penetration or oral sex; or
12	(b) knowingly acts with one or more persons who:
13	(i) also engage in an act or acts of sexual penetration or oral sex with
14	the same victim at the same place at a time contemporaneous with the actor's
15	violation of this Section; or
16	(ii) assist in the use of or threat to use aggravated physical force or
17	restraint when the actor's act of sexual penetration or oral sex occurs; or
18	(c) recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any person, and is aware of, yet
19	recklessly disregards, the risk of causing such injury.
20	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
21	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex under the
22	circumstances described in subsection(1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct
23	that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring in
24	a circumstance described in that subsection. If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative
25	defense of Explicit Prior Permission according to the terms of Section 213.10.
26	SECTION 213.2. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY PHYSICAL FORCE OR RESTRAINT
27	(1) Sexual Assault by Physical Force or Restraint. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault
28	by Physical Force or Restraint when:
29	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual

Section 213.1. Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint

- 1 penetration or oral sex; and
- 2 **(b)** the act is without effective consent because:

Section 213.3. Sexual Assault of an Incapacitated, Vulnerable, or Legally Restricted Person

1	(i) the actor uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use physical
2	force or restraint against anyone; and
3	(ii) the actor's use of or threat to use physical force or restraint causes
4	the other person to submit to or perform the act of sexual penetration or oral
5	sex; and
6	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
7	with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified
8	in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.
9	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Physical Force or Restraint is a felony of the third
10	degree [10-year maximum]. It is a registrable offense when the actor has previously been
11	convicted of a felony sex offense.
12	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
13	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex under the
14	circumstances described in subsection (1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct
15	that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring in
16	a circumstance described in that subsection. If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative
17	defense of Explicit Prior Permission according to the terms of Section 213.10.
18	SECTION 213.3 SEXUAL ASSAULT OF AN INCAPACITATED, VULNERABLE, OR LEGALLY
19	RESTRICTED PERSON
20	(1) (1) Sexual Assault of an Incapacitated Person. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault
21	of an Incapacitated Person when:
22	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
23	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
24	or oral sex; and
25	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act, the other
26	person:
27	(i) (ii) is sleeping, unconscious, or physically unable to communicate lack
28	of consent; or
29	(ii) (iii) lacks substantial capacity to appraise, control, or remember the

Section 213.3. Sexual Assault of an Incapacitated, Vulnerable, or Legally Restricted Person

1	person's own sexual conduct or that of anyone else because of a substance
2	administered to that person, without that person's knowledge or consent; and
3	the actor administered the incapacitating substance for the purpose of causing
4	that incapacity or knows that it was surreptitiously administered by another
5	for that purpose; and
6	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
7	with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified
8	in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.
9	Sexual Assault of an Incapacitated Person is a felony of the third degree [10-year
10	maximum]. It is a registrable offense when the actor has previously been convicted of a felony
11	sex offense.
12	(2) (2) Sexual Assault of a Vulnerable Person. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault of a
13	Vulnerable Person when:
14	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
15	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
16	or oral sex; and
17	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act, the other
18	person:
19	(i) (i) has an intellectual, developmental, or mental disability, or a
20	mental illness, that makes the person substantially incapable of appraising the
21	nature of the sexual activity involved, or of understanding the right to give or
22	withhold consent in sexual encounters, and the actor has no similarly serious
23	disability; or
24	(ii) (iii) is passing in and out of consciousness; or
25	(iii) (iii) lacks substantial capacity to communicate lack of consent; or
26	(iv) (iv) is wholly or partly undressed, or in the process of undressing,
27	for the purpose of receiving nonsexual professional or commercial services
28	from the actor and has not given the actor explicit prior permission to engage
29	in that act; and
30	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
31	with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances-described, and results specified

Section 213.3. Sexual Assault of an Incapacitated, Vulnerable, or Legally Restricted Person

- in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.
- Sexual Assault of a Vulnerable Person is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year
- 3 maximum].

Section 213.4. Sexual Assault by Extortion of a Legally Restricted Person. An actor is

1	(3) Sexual Assault of a Legally Restricted Person. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault
2	of Legally Restricted Person when:
3	(a) the actor, who did not have a consensual sexually intimate relationship with
4	the other person at the time that a state-imposed restriction on that person's liberty
5	began, engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another person or
6	causes the other person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral
7	sex; and
8	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act, the other
9	person is:
10	(i) in custody, incarcerated, on probation, on parole, under civil
11	commitment, in a pretrial release or pretrial diversion or treatment program,
12	or in any other status involving a state-imposed restriction on liberty; and
13	(ii) the actor is in a position of actual or apparent authority or
14	supervision over the restriction on the other person's liberty; and
15	(c) the actor knows that acts knowingly with respect to the conduct, attendant
16	circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.
17	Sexual Assault of a Legally Restricted Person is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year
18	maximum].
19	(4) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when a
20	condition or circumstance described in subsections (1)(b), (2)(b), or (3)(b) existed at the time
21	the other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex.
22	Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not
23	constitute effective consent when occurring in a condition or circumstance described in these
24	subsections.
25	SECTION 213.4. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY EXTORTION
26	(1) Sexual Assault by Extortion. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault by Extortion
27	when:
28	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
29	penetration or oral sex; and

Section 213.4. Sexual Assault by Extortion (b) the act is without effective consent because the actor explicitly or implicitly

1	(b) the act is without effective consent because the actor explicitly or implicitly
2	threatened:
3	(i) to accuse that person or anyone else of a criminal offense or of a
4	failure to comply with immigration regulations; or
5	(ii) to take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take
6	or withhold action, whether or not the purported official has actual authority
7	to do so; or
8	(iii) to take any action or cause any consequence that would cause
9	submission to or performance of the act of sexual penetration or oral sex by
10	someone of ordinary resolution in that person's situation under all the
11	circumstances; and
12	(iv) the actor's threat causes the other person to submit to or perform
13	the act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and
14	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
15	with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified
16	in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.
17	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Extortion is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year
18	maximum].
19	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
20	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex because of
21	a threat described in subsection (1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that
22	would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring in a
23	circumstance described in that paragraph. If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative
24	defense of Explicit Prior Permission under Section 213.10.
25	SECTION 213.5. SEXUAL ASSAULT BY PROHIBITED DECEPTION
26	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault by Prohibited Deception when:
27	(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
28	penetration or oral sex; and
29	(b) the act is without effective consent because:

Section 213.4. Sexual Assault by Extortion

1

(i) (i) the actor caused the other person to believe falsely that the act had

Section 213.6. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent

1	diagnostic, curative, or preventive medical properties; or
2	(ii) (iii) the actor caused the other person to believe falsely that the actor
3	was someone else who was personally known to that person; and
4	(iii) (iii) the actor's deception causes the other person to submit to or
5	perform the act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and
6	(c) the actor knows that is reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant
7	circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.
8	(2) Grading. Sexual Assault by Prohibited Deception is a felony of the fifth degree
9	[three-year maximum].
10	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
11	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual penetration or oral sex because of
12	a circumstance described in subsection (1)(b). Submission, acquiescence, or words or
13	conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when
14	occurring under in a circumstance described in that paragraph.
15	SECTION 213.6. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSENT
15 16	SECTION 213.6. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSENT (1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when:
16	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when:
16 17	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when:(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual
16 17 18	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when:(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and
16 17 18 19	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when:(a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and(b) the other person does not consent to that act; and
16 17 18 19 20	 (1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when: (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and (b) the other person does not consent to that act; and (c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
16 17 18 19 20 21	 (1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when: (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and (b) the other person does not consent to that act; and (c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 (1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when: (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and (b) the other person does not consent to that act; and (c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 (1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when: (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and (b) the other person does not consent to that act; and (c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present. (2) Grading. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent is a felony of the fifth degree
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when: (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and (b) the other person does not consent to that act; and (c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present. (2) Grading. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum], except that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum]
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	(1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when: (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and (b) the other person does not consent to that act; and (c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present. (2) Grading. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum], except that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum] when:
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	 (1) An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent when: (a) the actor causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration or oral sex; and (b) the other person does not consent to that act; and (c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) are present. (2) Grading. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum], except that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum] when: (a) the other person has, by words or actions, expressly communicated

Section 213.6. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent

1	(b) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, reckless with respect to the
2	risk that aattendant circumstance described specified in paragraph (a) existed at the
3	time of the act of sexual penetration or oral sex.
4	(3) If applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative defense of Explicit Prior
5	Permission under Section 213.10.
6	SECTION 213.7. OFFENSIVE SEXUAL CONTACT BY PHYSICAL FORCE OR RESTRAINT OR BY
7	SURREPTITIOUS INCAPACITATION; OFFENSIVE SEXUAL CONTACT
8	(1) Offensive Sexual Contact by Physical Force or Restraint or by Surreptitious
9	Incapacitation. An actor is guilty of Offensive Sexual Contact by Physical Force or Restraint
10	or by Surreptitious Incapacitation when:
11	(a) the actor knowingly engages in an act of sexual contact with another person
12	or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual contact—with any
13	person ; and
14	(b) the act is without effective consent because:
15	(i) the actor uses or explicitly or implicitly threatens to use physical
16	force or restraint against anyone, and that conduct causes the other person to
17	submit to or perform the act of sexual contact; or
18	(ii) at the time of the act of sexual contact the other person lacks
19	substantial capacity to appraise, control, or remember the person's own sexual
20	conduct or that of anyone else because of a substance administered to that
21	person, without that person's knowledge or consent; and the actor
22	administered the incapacitating substance for the purpose of causing that
23	incapacity or knows that it was surreptitiously administered by another for
24	that purpose; and
25	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that a circumstance
26	described in paragraph (b) is present, and that the other person submitted to or
27	performed the act of sexual contact because of a circumstance described reckless with
28	respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances, and results specified in paragraph
29	(b).

Section 213.6. Sexual Assault in the Absence of Consent

1	Offensive Sexual Contact by Physical Force or Restraint or by Surreptitious
2	Incapacitation is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum].
3	(2) Offensive Sexual Contact. An actor is guilty of Offensive Sexual Contact when:
4	(a) the actor knowingly engages in an act of sexual contact with another person
5	or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual contact-with
6	anyone; and

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1	(b) the other person did not consent to that act, and the actor is aware of, yet
2	recklessly disregards, the risk that the other person did not reckless with respect to
3	the lack of consent to that act; or
4	(c) that the act is without effective consent because:
5	(i) the other person is unaware that such act is occurring, or is
6	physically unable to communicate lack of consent at the time of the act; and
7	the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that reckless with
8	respect to whether the other person is in that condition at the time of the act;
9	or
10	(ii) the act would be an offense as defined by Section 213.3(2) or (3),
11	involving vulnerable or legally restricted persons, had the act been one of
12	sexual penetration or oral sex; or
13	(iii) the act would be an offense as defined by Section 213.4, involving
14	extortion, had the act been one of sexual penetration or oral sex; or
15	(iv) the act would be an offense as defined by Section 213.5, involving
16	prohibited deception, had the act been one of sexual penetration or oral sex.
17	Offensive Sexual Contact is a petty misdemeanor [six-month maximum].
18	(3) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
19	other person submitted to or performed the act of sexual contact under a circumstance
20	described in subsections (1)(b) or (2)(c). Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that
21	would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute effective consent when occurring <u>underin</u>
22	a circumstance described in those subsections. If applicable, an actor charged with a
23	violation of subsections (1)(b)(i), (2)(b), or (2)(c)(iii) may raise an affirmative defense of
24	Explicit Prior Permission under Section 213.10.
25	SECTION 213.8. SEXUAL OFFENSES INVOLVING MINORS
26	(1) Sexual Assault of a Minor. An actor is guilty of Sexual Assault of a Minor when:
27	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
28	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
29	or oral sex; and

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1	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
2	(i) the other person is younger than 16; and
3	(ii) the actor is more than five years older than the other person; and
4	(c) the actor is aware of, yet reeklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
5	with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified
6	in paragraphs (a) and (b) exist.
7	Sexual Assault of a Minor is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum] except
8	that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum] when at the time of the act the
9	actor is 21 or older, and it is a felony of the third degree [10-year maximum] and a registrable
10	offense when at the time of the act the actor is 21 or older, the other person is younger than
11	12, and the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that reckless with respect to
12	whether the other person is younger than 12.
13	(2) Incestuous Sexual Assault of a Minor. An actor is guilty of Incestuous Sexual
14	Assault of a Minor when:
15	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
16	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
17	or oral sex; and
18	(b) at the time of the act, the actor is 18 or older and the other person is
19	younger than 18; and
20	(c) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act the actor
21	is:
22	(i) a parent or grandparent of the other person, including a biological,
23	step, adoptive, or foster parent or grandparent; or
24	(ii) the legal spouse, domestic partner, or sexual partner of a person
25	described by subparagraph (i); or
26	(iii) a legal guardian or de facto parent of the other person, who resides
27	intermittently or permanently in the same dwelling as the other person; and
28	(d) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
29	with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified
30	in paragraphs (a) through <u>, (b), and</u> (c) exist.

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1	Incestuous Sexual Assault of a Minor is a felony of the third degree [10-year
2	maximum]. It is a registrable offense when at the time of the act the other person is younger
3	than 16.
4	(3) Exploitative Sexual Assault of a Minor. An actor is guilty of Exploitative Sexual
5	Assault of a Minor when:
6	(a) the actor engages in an act of sexual penetration or oral sex with another
7	person or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual penetration
8	or oral sex; and
9	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
10	(i) the other person is younger than 18; and
11	(ii) the actor is more than five years older than the other person; and
12	(iii) the actor holds over the other person a formal position of authority
13	over the other person, such as a teacher, employer, religious leader, treatment
14	provider, administrator, or coach; and
15	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that the reckless
16	with respect to the conduct, attendant circumstances described, and results specified
17	in paragraphs (a) and (b) exist.
18	Exploitative Sexual Assault of a Minor is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year
19	maximum]. It is a defense to a prosecution under Section 213.8(3) for the actor to prove by
20	a preponderance of the evidence that the actor's position of authority over the other person
21	did not impair the other person's ability to form an independent judgment about whether to
22	consent to the act of sexual penetration or oral sex.
23	(4) Fondling a Minor. An actor is guilty of Fondling a Minor when:
24	(a) the actor knowingly fondles another person, or knowingly causes another
25	person to submit to or perform an act of fondling with anyone; and
26	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
27	(i) the other person is younger than 12 and the actor is more than five
28	years older than the other person; or
29	(ii) the other person is younger than 16 and the actor is more than seven
30	years older than the other person; and

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1	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, reckless with respect to the
2	risk that the attendant circumstances described in paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) exist.
3	Grading. Fondling a Minor is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum], except
4	that it is a felony of the fourth degree [five-year maximum] when at the time of the act the
5	actor is 21 or older, the other person is younger than 12, and the actor is aware of, yet
6	recklessly disregards, the risk that reckless with respect to whether the other person is
7	younger than 12.
8	(5) Aggravated Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor. An actor is guilty of Aggravated
9	Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor when:
10	(a) the actor knowingly engages in an act of sexual contact with another person
11	or causes another person to submit to or perform an act of sexual contact; and
12	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:
13	(i) the other person is younger than 18; and
14	(ii) the actor is more than five years older than the other person; and
15	(iii) the act, had it been an act of sexual penetration or oral sex, would
16	be an offense as defined by Section 213.1, 213.2, 213.3, 213.4, 213.5, or 213.8(2)
17	or (3); and
18	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, reckless with respect to the
19	risk that the attendant circumstances described in paragraph (b)(i) and (ii) exist.
20	Aggravated Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor is a felony of the fourth degree
21	[five-year maximum].
22	(6) Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor. An actor is guilty of Offensive Sexual
23	Contact with a Minor when:
24	(a) the actor knowingly engages with another person in, or causes another
25	person to submit to or perform:
26	(i) an act of sexual contact; or
27	(ii) an act involving the touching of the tongue of anyone to any body
28	part or object, when that act is for the purpose of anyone's sexual arousal,
29	sexual gratification, sexual humiliation, or sexual degradation; and
30	(b) the act is without effective consent because at the time of the act:

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1	(i) the other person is younger than 12, and the actor is more than five
2	years older than the other person; or
3	(ii) the other person is younger than 16, and the actor is more than
4	seven years older than the other person; and
5	(c) the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, reckless with respect to the
5	risk that the attendant circumstances described in paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) exist.
7	Offensive Sexual Contact with a Minor is a misdemeanor [one-year maximum], except
3	that it is a felony of the fifth degree [three-year maximum] when at the time of the act the

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1	actor is 21 or older, the other person is younger than 12, and the actor is aware of, yet
2	recklessly disregards, the risk that reckless with respect to whether the other person is
3	younger than 12.
4	(7) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
5	circumstances described in any of the subsections (1) through (6) exist at the time of the act.
6	Submission, acquiescence, or words or conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not
7	constitute effective consent when occurring undering the circumstances described in any of
8	those subsections.
9	(8) Calculation of ages. The age of any person described in this Section is calculated
10	according to the "days-and-month" approach, which determines age by the day, month, and
11	year of that person's birth, measured in whole numbers.
12	[(9) Affirmative defense of marriage. It is an affirmative defense to a charge under
13	subsections (1), (3), (4), and (6) of this Section, and to a charge under subsection (5)($\frac{d\underline{b}}{\underline{b}}$) based
14	on an act that would be a violation of subsection (8)(3) had it been an act of sexual penetration
15	or oral sex, that the actor was the legal spouse of the other person at the time of the act of
16	sexual penetration, oral sex, fondling, or sexual contact.]
17	(10) In a juvenile court proceeding to adjudicate delinquency on the basis of conduct
18	that would constitute an offense under this Section, an actor younger than 14 may be
19	adjudicated delinquent only as a misdemeanant, regardless of the penalty authorized for that
20	conduct when it constitutes an offense under this Section.
21	SECTION 213.9. SEX TRAFFICKING
22	(1) Sex Trafficking. An actor is guilty of Sex Trafficking if the actor knowingly
23	recruits, entices, transports, transfers, harbors, provides, isolates, or maintains a person by
24	any means, with the purpose of facilitating a commercial sex act involving that person when:
25	(a) coercion is being, or will be, used to cause the person to submit to or
26	perform a commercial sex act, which therefore will be without effective consent; and
27	the actor knows that coercion is being or will be used to cause the person to submit to

or perform that commercial sex act; or

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1	(b) the person is younger than 18 and is being, or will be, caused to submit to
2	or perform a commercial sex act; and the actor is aware of, yet recklessly disregards,
3	the risk that reckless with respect to whether the person is younger than 18 and is
4	being, or will be, caused to submit to or perform the commercial sex act.
5	(2) Definitions. For purposes of Section 213.9(1):
6	(a) "Coercion" means:
7	(i) using or threatening to use physical force or restraint against
8	anyone;
9	(ii) taking, destroying, or threatening to take or destroy the person's
10	money, credit or debit card, passport, driver's license, immigration document,
11	or other government-issued identification document, including a document
12	issued by a foreign government, or any travel document pertaining to the
13	person;
14	(iii) restricting or threatening to restrict the person's access to a
15	substance that is a controlled substance under the federal Controlled
16	Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.;
17	(iv) administering or withholding a controlled substance in
18	circumstances that impair the person's physical or mental ability to avoid,
19	evade, or flee from the actor;
20	(v) using a scheme, plan, deception, misrepresentation, or pattern of
21	behavior for the purpose of causing the person to believe that failing to submit
22	to or perform a commercial sex act would result in physical, psychological,
23	financial, or reputational harm to anyone that is sufficiently serious to cause
24	someone of ordinary resolution, who is of the same background, in the same
25	circumstances, and in the same physical and mental condition as that person,
26	to submit to or perform a commercial sex act in order to avoid incurring that
27	harm; or
28	(vi) any combination of these circumstances.
29	(b) "Commercial Sex Act" means any act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or
30	sexual contact performed in exchange, or the expectation of exchange, for money,
31	property, services, or any other thing of value given to or received by anyone.

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1 (3) Grading. Sex Trafficking is a felony of the third degree [10-year maximum].

Section 213.10. Affirmative Defense of Explicit Prior Permission

1	(4) Effective consent. Consent is ineffective under Section 213.0(2)(e)(iv) when the
2	eireumstances a circumstance described in subsection (1) areis present. Submission,
3	acquiescence, or words or conduct that would otherwise indicate consent do not constitute
4	effective consent when occurring under a circumstance described in that subsection. If
5	applicable, the actor may raise an affirmative defense of Explicit Prior Permission under
6	Section 213.10 when:
7	(a) a charge of Sex Trafficking is based on coercion under subsection (1)(a);
8	and
9	(b) the person giving such permission does so before that person has been
10	subjected to trafficking under subsection (1) and before that person has been
11	subjected to coercion under subsection (1)(a).
12	SECTION 213.10. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF EXPLICIT PRIOR PERMISSION
13	(1) Except as provided in subsection (3), it is an affirmative defense to a charge under
14	this Article that the actor reasonably believed that, in connection with the charged act of
15	sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact, the other party personally gave the actor
16	explicit prior permission to use or threaten to use physical force or restraint, or to inflict or
17	threaten to inflict any harm otherwise proscribed by Sections 213.1, 213.2, 213.4, 213.7, or
18	213.9, or to ignore the absence of consent otherwise proscribed by Section 213.6.
19	(2) Permission is "explicit" under subsection (1) only when it is given orally or by
20	written agreement:
21	(a) specifying that the actor may ignore the other party's expressions of
22	unwillingness or other absence of consent;
23	(b) identifying the specific forms and extent of force, restraint, or threats that
24	are permitted; and
25	(c) stipulating the specific words or gestures that will withdraw the permission.
26	Permission given by gestures or other nonverbal conduct signaling assent is not
27	"explicit" under subsection (1).
28	(3) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable when:

Section 213.10. Affirmative Defense of Explicit Prior Permission

1	(a) the act of sexual penetration, oral sex, or sexual contact occurs after the
2	explicit permission was withdrawn, and the actor is aware of, yet recklessly
3	disregards, the risk that reckless with respect to whether the permission was
4	withdrawn;
5	(b) the actor relies on permission to use force or restraint or ignore the absence
6	of consent at a time when the other party will be unconscious, asleep, or otherwise
7	unable to withdraw that permission;
8	(c) the actor <u>recklessly</u> engages in conduct that causes or risks serious bodily
9	injury and in so doing is aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk of such injury;
10	or
11	(d) at the time explicit permission is given, the other party is, and the actor is
12	aware of, yet recklessly disregards, the risk that reckless with respect to whether the
13	other party is:
14	(i) younger than 18;
15	(ii) giving that permission while subjected to physical force or restraint;
16	(iii) giving that permission because of the use of or threat to use physical
17	force or restraint, or extortion as defined by Section 213.4, if that party does
18	not give the permission;
19	(iv) lacking substantial capacity to appraise or control his or herthat
20	party's conduct as a result of intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary,
21	and regardless of the identity of the person who administered the intoxicants;
22	(v) incapacitated, vulnerable, or legally restricted, as defined by Section
23	213.3;
24	(vi) subject to prohibited deception, as defined by Section 213.5; or
25	(vii) subject to trafficking, as defined by Section 213.9(1).
26	SECTION 213.11. SENTENCING AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
27	(1) Definitions. For purposes of this Article:
28	(a) "sentencing consequences" are penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages that
29	are part of the sentence imposed by the court or by an agency authorized to set the

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- terms of parole or post-release supervision in connection with conviction of an Article
- 2 213 offense; and
- 3 (b) "collateral consequences" are penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages,

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1	however denominated, that are authorized or required by federal, state, or local law
2	as a direct result of an individual's conviction of an Article 213 offense but are not
3	part of the sentence imposed by the court or by an agency authorized to set the terms
4	of parole or post-release supervision in connection with that conviction.
5	(2) General Rule. Sentencing procedure, the authorized disposition of a person
6	convicted of an Article 213 offense, sentencing consequences, and collateral consequences are
7	specified in Articles 6 and 7 of this Code,* and are subject to the additional requirements of
8	this Section.
9	(3) Additional Requirements for Sentencing Consequences. Notwithstanding any
10	contrary provisions of law, the conditions of any suspended sentence under Section 6.02(2),
11	any sentence to probation under Section 6.05, and any terms of parole or post-release
12	supervision under Section 6.13 must be eligible for early relief under Section 213.11J and
13	must not include:
14	(a) a condition that:
15	(i) imposes an obligation to register with law enforcement that carries
16	requirements other than those authorized under Sections 213.11A-213.11G
17	and Section 213.11J;
18	(ii) permits access to the person's registry information, except as
19	authorized under Section 213.11H; or
20	(iii) authorizes or permits any government official to notify a public or
21	private entity or individual, other than a government law-enforcement agency
22	or individual, that the person is registered with law enforcement or resides,
23	works, or studies in the locality;
24	(b) a condition that restricts the person's occupation or employment, except as
25	required by state law or authorized under paragraph (d) of this subsection; or
26	(c) except as authorized under paragraph (d) of this subsection, a condition
27	that:
28	(i) requires the person to submit to GPS monitoring; or
29	(ii) restricts the person's education, Internet access, or place of

 $^{^{\}ast}$ Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Official Statutory Text (May 24, 2017).

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1	residence.
2	(d) The court, and any agency authorized to set the terms of parole or post-
3	release supervision, may impose a condition, not required by state law, that restricts
4	the person's occupation or employment, or a condition specified in paragraph (c) of
5	this subsection, only if the court or agency determines that the condition is manifestly
6	required in the interest of public safety. That determination must be:
7	(i) made after due consideration of the nature of the offense; all other
8	circumstances of the case; the person's prior record; and the potential
9	negative impacts of the burden, restriction, requirement, or government
10	action on the person, on the person's family, and on the person's prospects for
11	rehabilitation and reintegration into society; and
12	(ii) accompanied by a written statement of the official setting the
13	condition, explaining the need for it, the evidentiary basis for the finding of
14	need, and the reasons why a more narrowly drawn condition would not
15	adequately meet that need.
16	(e) Any condition imposed under paragraph (d) must be:
17	(i) drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the goal of public safety;
18	and
19	(ii) imposed only for a period not to exceed that permitted under
20	Section 213.11F for the duties to register and keep the registration current.
21	(4) Additional Requirements for Collateral Consequences that are Applicable Primarily
22	to Persons Convicted of a Sexual Offense. Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law,
23	collateral consequences applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense,
24	including the obligation to register with law enforcement; associated duties; restrictions on
25	occupation and employment, education, and place of residence applicable primarily to
26	persons convicted of a sexual offense; and other collateral consequences applicable primarily
27	to persons convicted of a sexual offense, are authorized and their scope and implementation
28	are delineated as follows:
29	(a) The person's obligation to register for law-enforcement purposes is
30	governed by Section 213.11A.
31	(b) Notification of the person's obligation to register and associated duties

Section 213.11. Sentencing and Collateral Consequences of Conviction

is governed by Section 213.11B. 1

Section 213.11A. Registration for Law-Enforcement Purposes

1	(c) The time of initial registration is governed by Section 213.11C.
2	(d) The information required upon registration is specified in Section
3	213.11D.
4	(e) The duty to keep registration current is specified in Section 213.11E.
5	(f) The duration of the registration requirements is specified in Section
6	213.11F.
7	(g) Penalties for failure to register are governed by Section 213.11G.
8	(h) Access to registry information is governed by Section 213.11H.
9	(i) Collateral consequences applicable primarily to persons convicted of a
10	sexual offense, other than the obligation to register for law-enforcement purposes
11	and restrictions on occupation and employment required by state law, are
12	governed by Section 213.11I.
13	(j) Standards and procedures for relief from the obligation to register,
14	associated duties, and other collateral consequences applicable specifically to
15	persons convicted of a sexual offense are governed by Section 213.11J.
16	(5) Retroactive Effect. As of the effective date of this Section, all prior registration
17	requirements and other collateral consequences applicable primarily to persons
18	convicted of a sexual offense, whether imposed by this or any other jurisdiction, are
19	subject to the requirements and limits of this Section and Sections 213.11A-J.
20	SECTION 213.11A. REGISTRATION FOR LAW-ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
21	(1) Offenses Committed Convictions in This Jurisdiction

(1) Offenses Committed Convictions in This Jurisdiction

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(a) Except as provided in subsection (3), every person convicted of an offense that is designated a registrable offense in this Article must, in addition to any other sanction imposed upon conviction, appear personally and register, at the time specified in Section 213.11C, with the law-enforcement authority designated by law in the [county] where the person resides. If the person who is required to register under this subsection does not reside in this jurisdiction, but works in this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person

Section 213.11A. Registration for Law-Enforcement Purposes

works; if the person does not reside or work in this jurisdiction but is enrolled in a program of study in this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person studies.

- (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no conviction for an offense under this Article, or for any other criminal offense in this jurisdiction, will require the person convicted to register with law enforcement or other governmental authority in a registry regime applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense, unless this Article designates that offense as a registrable offense.
- (2) Offenses Committed Convictions in Other Jurisdictions

- (a) Duty to register and related duties. Every person currently obliged to register with law enforcement or other pubic authority in another jurisdiction, because of a sexual <code>=offense committedconviction</code> in that jurisdiction, who subsequently resides, works, or enrolls in a program of study in this jurisdiction, must register with the law-enforcement authority designated by law and comply with the requirements of Sections 213.11A-213.11G, provided that the <code>conviction</code> offense committed in the other jurisdiction is comparable to an offense that would be registrable under this Article if committed in this jurisdiction.
- (b) *Place of registration*. If the person who is obliged to register under paragraph (a) resides in this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person resides. If the person who is obliged to register under paragraph (a) does not reside in this jurisdiction, but works in this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person works; if the person does not reside or work in this jurisdiction but is enrolled in a program of study this jurisdiction, registration must be accomplished in the [county] where the person studies.
- (c) Determining the comparability of in-state and out-of-state conviction offenses in other jurisdictions
 - (i) Standard. An <u>A conviction</u> offense committed in another jurisdiction is comparable to a registrable offense under this Article if and only if the elements of the <u>out-of-stateother jurisdiction's</u> offense are no broader than the elements of that registrable offense. When, regardless of the conduct

Section 213.11A. Registration for Law-Enforcement Purposes

1	underlying the out-of-state other jurisdiction's conviction, the out-of-
2	stateother jurisdiction's offense can be committed by conduct that is not
3	sufficient to establish a registrable offense under this

Section 213.11B. Notification of the Obligation to Register and Associated Duties

1	Article, the two offenses are not comparable.
2	(ii) <i>Procedure</i> . Before determining that ana conviction offense
3	committed in another jurisdiction is comparable to a registrable offense under
4	this Article, the authority designated to make that determination must give the
5	person concerned notice and an opportunity to be heard on that question,
6	either orally or in writing.
7	(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no conviction for a sexual
8	offense in another jurisdiction will require the offender to register with law
9	enforcement or other governmental authority in this jurisdiction, unless that
10	conviction currently requires the offender to register with law enforcement or other
11	governmental authority in the that jurisdiction where the offense was committed and
12	the conviction is for an offense comparable to an offense that would be registrable
13	under this Article if committed in this jurisdiction.
14	(3) Persons under Under the age Age of 18. No person may be subject to the obligation
15	to register under subsection (1) of this Section, to other obligations or restrictions under this
16	Section, or to additional collateral consequences under Section 213.11I, on the basis of a
17	criminal conviction for an offense committed when the person was under the age of 18, or on
18	the basis of an adjudication of delinquency based on conduct when the person was under the
19	age of 18; provided, however, that this subsection (3) does not apply to a person convicted of
20	a criminal offense of Sexual Assault by Aggravated Physical Force or Restraint if the person
21	was at least 16 years old at the time of that offense.
22	SECTION 213.11B. NOTIFICATION OF THE OBLIGATION TO REGISTER AND ASSOCIATED DUTIES
23	(1) Before accepting a guilty plea, and at the time of sentencing after conviction
24	on a guilty plea or at trial, the sentencing judge must:
25	(a) inform the person who is subject to registration of the registration
26	requirement;
27	(b) explain the associated duties, including:
28	(i) the identity and location, or procedure for determining the identity
29	and location, of the law-enforcement agency where the person must appear to

Section 213.11B. Notification of the Obligation to Register and Associated Duties

1	register as required by Section 213.11A;
2	(ii) the duty to register with a law-enforcement agency in any locality
3	where the person subsequently resides, including the possible duty to register
4	with a law-enforcement agency or other government authority in another
5	jurisdiction to which the person subsequently moves;
6	(iii) the duty to report to that office or agency periodically in person, as
7	required by Section 213.11E(1); and
8	(iv) the duty to promptly notify at least one of the local jurisdictions
9	where the person is registered of any change in the registry information
10	pertaining to that person, as required by Section 213.11E(2);
11	(c) notify the person of the right to petition for relief from those duties as
12	provided in Section 213.11J;
13	(d) confirm that defense counsel has explained to that person those duties and
14	the right to petition for relief from those duties;
15	(e) confirm that the person understands those duties and that right;
16	(f) require the person to read and sign a form stating that defense counsel and
17	the sentencing judge have explained the applicable duties and the right to petition for
18	relief from those duties, and that the person understands those duties and that right;
19	(g) ensure that if the person convicted of a sexual offense cannot read or
20	understand the language in which the form is written, the person will be informed of
21	the pertinent information by other suitable means that the jurisdiction uses to
22	communicate with such individuals; and
23	(h) satisfy all other notification requirements applicable under Model Penal
24	Code: Sentencing, Section 7.04(1).
25	(2) At the time of sentencing, the convicted person shall receive a copy of the form
26	signed pursuant to subsection (1)(f) of this Section.
27	(3) If the convicted person is sentenced to a custodial sanction, an appropriate official
28	must, shortly before the person's release from custody, again inform the person of the
29	registration requirement, explain the associated rights and duties, including the right to
30	petition for relief from those duties, and require the person to read and sign a form stating

Section 213.11D. Information Required in Registration

that those rights and duties have been explained and that the person understands those rights

and duties. At the time of release from custody, the person concerned shall receive a copy of

3	that form.
4	SECTION 213.11C. TIME OF INITIAL REGISTRATION
5	A person subject to registration must initially register:
6	(a) if incarcerated after sentence is imposed, then within three business days
7	after release; or
8	(b) if not incarcerated after sentence is imposed, then not later than five
9	business days after being sentenced for the offense giving rise to the duty of
10	registration.
11	SECTION 213.11D. INFORMATION REQUIRED IN REGISTRATION
12	(1) A person subject to registration under Section 213.11A must provide the following
13	information to the appropriate official for inclusion in the law-enforcement registry:
14	(a) the name of the person (including any alias used by the person);
15	(b) the Social Security number, if any, of the person;
16	(c) the address of each place where the person resides or expects to reside;
17	(d) the name and address of any place where the person works or expects to
18	work;
19	(e) the name and address of any place where the person is a student or expects
20	to be a student;
21	(f) the license-plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or
22	regularly operated by the person.
23	(2) Supplementary Information. The local jurisdiction in which a person registers must
24	ensure that the following information is included in the registry for that person and kept up
25	to date:
26	(a) the text of the provision of law defining the sexual offense for which the
27	person is registered;

Section 213.11D. Information Required in Registration

1	(b) the person's criminal history, including the date and offense designation of
2	all convictions; and the person's parole, probation, or supervised-release status;
3	(c) any other information required by law.
4	(3) Registrants Who Lack a Stable Residential Address. If a person required to register
5	lacks a stable residential address, the person must, at the time of registration, report with as
6	much specificity as possible the principal place where the person sleeps, instead of the
7	information required under subsection (1)(c).
8	(4) The local jurisdiction in which a person registers must promptly provide the
9	information specified in subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this Section to an appropriate law-
10	enforcement authority in every other jurisdiction in which the registrant works or expects
11	to work and is enrolled or expects to enroll in a program of study.
12	(5) Correction of Errors. Each locality where a person registers and each locality that
13	receives information about a registrant pursuant to subsection (4) of this Section must
14	provide efficacious, reasonably accessible procedures for correcting erroneous registry
15	information. Each locality where a person registers must, at the time of registration, provide
16	the registrant instructions on how to use those procedures to seek correction of registry
17	information that the registrant believes to be erroneous.
18	SECTION 213.11E. DUTY TO KEEP REGISTRATION CURRENT
19	(1) <u>Periodie Annual</u> Updates .
20	(a) A person who is required to register under Section 213.11A must, not less
21	frequently than once every year, appear in person in at least onethe jurisdiction where the
22	person is required to register under Section 213.11A, verify the current accuracy of the
23	information provided in compliance with Section 213.11D(1), allow the jurisdiction to take a
24	current photograph, and report any change in the identity of other jurisdictions in which the
25	person is required to register or in which the person works or is enrolled in a program of
26	study.
27	(b) Not less than 30 nor more than 45 days before the person's annual registration
28	date, the authority where the person is registered under Section 213.11A must alert the
29	registrant to the requirements of this Section by sending written notice to the person's

Section 213.11D. Information Required in Registration

1 residential address.

Section 213.11E. Duty to Keep Registration Current

1	(c) in the case of registrants who tack a stable residential address, and therefore
2	report instead the principal place or places where they sleep, as provided in Section
3	213.11D(3), the authority where the person is registered under Section 213.11A must make
4	a good-faith effort to provide this written notice to the person at the location the person has
5	reported as the principal place where the person sleeps.
6	(2) Change of Circumstances
7	(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a person subject to
8	registration under Section 213.11A must, not later than five business days after each
9	change of name and each change in the location where the person resides, works, or
10	is enrolled in a program of study, notify at least one the local jurisdiction specified in
11	Section 213.11A of:
12	(i) all changes in the information that the person is required to provide
13	under Section 213.11D, and
14	(ii) the identity of all other jurisdictions in which the person resides,
15	works, or is enrolled in a program of study.
16	(b) Registrants who lack a stable residential address, and therefore report
17	instead the principal place or places where they sleep, as provided in Section
18	213.11D(3), must confirm or update those locations once every 90 days but need not
19	do so more often.
20	(c) Each jurisdiction that maintains a registry of persons who have been
21	convicted of a sexual offense must permit registrants to notify the jurisdiction, by one
22	or more reliable, readily accessible methods of communication of the jurisdiction's
23	choosing, such as U.S. mail, submission of an appropriate form online, or otherwise,
24	of any change of name, residence, employment, student status, or vehicle regularly
25	used, and any change in the identity of all other jurisdictions in which the person
26	resides, works, or is enrolled in a program of study.
27	(d) Each jurisdiction where a person registers pursuant to Section 213.11A
28	must advise the registrant, at the time of registration, of the registrant's option to use
29	the means of communication established under subsection (2)(c), rather than
30	appearing personally for that purpose, if the registrant so chooses, other than for the

Section 213.11E. Duty to Keep Registration Current

1	annual in-person meeting requirement of subsection (1).	
2	(3) The local jurisdiction notified of any changes pursuant to subsections (1) and (2)	
3	must promptly provide the registrant a written receipt confirming that the updated	
4	information has been provided, and must provide that information to all other jurisdictions	
5	in which the person resides, works, or is enrolled in a program of study.	
6	SECTION 213.11F. DURATION OF REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT	
7		
8	(1) Ordinary Termination	
9	(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (32) of this Section and Section	
10	213.11J, a person required to register must keep the registration current for a period	
11	of 15 years, beginning on the date when the registrant is released from custody after	
12	conviction for the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or if the	
13	registrant is not sentenced to a term of incarceration, beginning on the date when the	
14	registrant was sentenced for that offense.	
15	(2b) At the expiration of that 15-year period, the duty to keep that registration	
16	current will terminate; and the person who had been registered will not be subject to	
17	any further duties associated with that registration requirement; and no public or	
18	private agency other than a government law enforcement agency shall thereafter be	
19	permitted access to the person's registry information. The person will remain subject	
20	to any registration requirement that arises from conviction of any other sexual	
21	offense.	
22	(c) In determining whether the 15-year period has been completed, that period	
23	shall include any time in which the person was registered, prior to the effective date	
24	of Sections 213.11 and 213.11A-J, for the offense giving rise to that registration	
25	requirement.	
26	(32) Early termination Termination. If, during the first 10 years of the period during	
27	which a person is required to keep registration information current, the person:	
28	(a) successfully completes any period of supervised release, probation, or	
29	parole, and satisfies any financial obligation such as a fine or restitution, other than	

Section 213.11E. Duty to Keep Registration Current

1	a financial obligation that the person, despite good-faith effort, has been unable to
2	pay; and
3	(b) successfully completes any required sexual-offense treatment program;
4	and

Section 213.11F. Duration of Registration Requirement

1	(c) is not convicted of, or facing pending charges for, any subsequent offense
2	under this Article, or any subsequent sexual offense in another jurisdiction that would
3	be an offense under this Article if committed in this jurisdiction; then:
4	the duty to keep that registry information current will terminate; the person who had
5	been registered will not be subject to any further duties associated with that registration
6	requirement; and subsequent access to registry information will be governed by subsection
7	(<u>43</u>).
8	(43) Access to Registry Information after After Termination. When the person's
9	obligation to register and to keep registry information current terminates under subsection
10	(21) or (32), subsequent access to registry information is limited as follows:
11	(a) Registry information recorded as of the date when termination takes effect
12	may remain available to any government law-enforcement agency seeking disclosure
13	of that information in compliance with Section 213.11H(1)(a).
14	(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a), no public or private agency may
15	thereafter be permitted access to registry information concerning the person whose
16	obligation to register and keep registry information publicassociated with a
17	registration requirement that has terminated.
18	(54) Notice of Termination. When a person's duty to register terminates under
19	subsection $(\frac{21}{2})$ or $(\frac{32}{2})$, the law-enforcement agency in the local jurisdiction where the person
20	resides must:
21	(a) include in its registry a notice that the person's duty to register and all
22	duties associated with that registration requirement have terminated; and
23	(b) upon the person's request, notify all other jurisdictions where the person
24	is registered and where information about the registrant has been provided pursuant
25	to Section 213.11D(4) that the person's duty to register and all duties associated with
26	that registration requirement have terminated and that no public or private agency
27	other than a government law-enforcement agency shall thereafter be permitted to
28	have access to that registry information.
29	(65) Certification. When a person's duty to register terminates under subsection (21)
30	or (32) , the law-enforcement agency in the local jurisdiction where the person resides must,
31	upon request, provide that person a certificate attesting that person's duty to register and

Section 213.11F. Duration of Registration Requirement

1 all duties associated with that registration requirement have terminated.

Section 213.11G. Failure to Register

I	SECTION 213.11G. FAILURE TO REGISTER	
2	(1) Offense of Failure to Register. A person required to register under Section 213.11A	
3	is guilty of Failure to Register, a misdemeanor, if that person knowingly fails to register as	
4	required by Sections 213.11A, 213.11C, 213.11D, and 213.11E(1), or knowingly fails to	
5	update a registration as required by Section 213.11E(2).	
6	(2) Affirmative Defense. In a prosecution for Failure to Register under subsection (1)	
7	of this Section, it is an affirmative defense that:	
8	(a) circumstances beyond the control of the accused prevented the accused	
9	from complying;	
10	(b) the accused did not voluntarily recklessly contribute to the creation of those	
11	circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to comply; and	
12	(c) after those circumstances ceased to exist, the accused complied as soon as	
13	reasonably feasible.	
14	(3) Other Consequences of Not Meeting Registration Requirements. Failing to register	
15	or to meet other registration requirements may not be a basis for revoking bail, probation,	
16	parole, or other conditions of release from custody, unless the person who failed to do so has	
17	been convicted under this Section of the offense of Failure to Register.	
18	SECTION 213.11H. ACCESS TO REGISTRY INFORMATION	
19	(1) Confidentiality	
20	(a) Each law-enforcement agency with which a person is registered and each	
21	law-enforcement agency that receives information about a registrant pursuant to	
22	Section 213.11D(4) must exercise due diligence to ensure that all information about	
23	the registrant remains confidential, except that relevant information about a specific	
24	registrant must be made available to any government law-enforcement agency that	
25	requests information to aid in the investigation of a specific criminal offense.	
26	(b) Any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (a) must include a warning that:	
27	(i) the law-enforcement agency receiving the information must exercise	
28	due diligence to ensure that the information remains confidential;	
29	(ii) such information may be disclosed and used as provided in	

Section 213.I. Additional Collateral Consequences of Conviction

narggraph (a) but otherwise must not be disclosed to any person or public or

1	paragraph (a), but other wise must not be disclosed to any person of public of	
2	private agency;	
3	(iii) such information may be used only for the purpose requested;	
4	(iv) such information may not be used to injure, harass, or commit a	
5	crime against the registrant or anyone else; and	
6	(v) any failure to comply with the confidentiality and use-limitation	
7	requirements of paragraph (b) could result in civil or criminal penalties.	
8	(2) Unauthorized Disclosure of Registry Information. An actor is guilty of	
9	Unauthorized Disclosure of Registry Information if:	
10	(a) the actor, having received registry information as provided in subsection	
11	(1), knowingly or recklessly discloses that information, or permits that information to	
12	be disclosed, to any person not authorized to receive it; or	
13	(b) the actor obtains access to registry information by computer trespassing or	
14	otherwise in violation of law and subsequently knowingly or recklessly discloses that	
15	information, or permits that information to be disclosed, to any other person.	
16	Unauthorized Disclosure of Registry Information is a felony of the fourth degree [five-	
17	year maximum].	

SECTION 213.11I, ADDITIONAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION

(1) Definition. For purposes of this Section, the term "additional collateral consequence" means any collateral consequence, as defined in Section 213.11(1)(b), that is applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense, other than the obligation to register with law enforcement specified in Section 213.11A, the associated duties and restrictions specified in Sections 213.11C-213.11G, and any restriction on occupation or employment required by state law. These additional collateral consequences include any government-imposed program or restriction applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense that restricts the convicted person's occupation or employment except as required by state law; limits the convicted person's education, Internet access, or place of residence; uses methods such as GPS monitoring to track the person's movements; notifies a community organization or entity or a private party that the person resides, works, or

Section 213.I. Additional Collateral Consequences of Conviction

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studies in the locality; or permits a public or private agency, organization, or person to access
registry information, except as authorized by Section 213.11H. An "additional collateral
consequence" under this Section does not include a collateral consequence that applies to
persons convicted of many different offenses, such as any government-imposed limits on
voting, jury service, access to public benefits, and other government-imposed penalties,
disabilities, and disadvantages that result from conviction of a wide variety of offenses,
including but not limited to sexual offenses.
(2) Additional Collateral Consequences Precluded for Persons Not Required to Register.

- (2) Additional Collateral Consequences Precluded for Persons Not Required to Register. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an additional collateral consequence, as defined in subsection (1), unless that person has been convicted of a registrable offense and is required to register with law enforcement under Section 213.11A.
- (3) Additional Collateral Consequences Precluded for Persons Required to Register. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person required to register with law enforcement under Section 213.11A must not be subject to any government action notifying a community organization or entity or a private party that the person resides, works, or studies in the locality; and must not be subject to any government action permitting a public or private agency, organization, or person to access registry information, except as authorized by Section 213.11H.
- (4) Additional Collateral Consequences Available for Persons Required to Register. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person required to register with law enforcement under Section 213.11A may be subject to an additional collateral consequence not specified in subsection (3), but only if an official designated by law, after affording the person notice and an opportunity to respond concerning the proposed additional collateral consequence, determines that the additional collateral consequence is manifestly required in the interest of public safety, after due consideration of:
 - (a) the nature of the offense;
 - (b) all other circumstances of the case;
 - (c) the person's prior record; and
 - (d) the potential negative impacts of the burden, restriction, requirement, or government action on the person, on the person's family, and on the person's prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

Section 213.J. Discretionary Relief from Registration and Other Sentencing Consequences

1	(5) Limitations. The designated official who approves any additional collateral	
2	consequence pursuant to subsection (4) of this Section must determine that the additional	
3	collateral consequence:	
4	(a) satisfies all applicable notification requirements set forth in Section	
5	213.11B;	
6	(b) is authorized by law;	
7	(c) is drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the goal of public safety;	
8	(d) is accompanied by a written statement of the official approving the	
9	additional collateral consequence, explaining the need for it, the evidentiary basis for	
10	the finding of need, and the reasons why a more narrowly drawn restriction,	
11	disability, or government action would not adequately meet that need; and	
12	(e) is imposed only for a period not to exceed that permitted under Section	
13	213.11F for the duties to register and keep the registration current.	
14	(6) Confidentiality. In any proceeding under subsection (4) to consider whether to	
15	impose an additional collateral consequence, the official responsible for making the	
16	determination must insure that the identity of the registrant concerned remains confidential.	
17	(7) Judicial Review. A person on whom an additional collateral consequence has been	
18	imposed under subsections (4) and (5) is entitled to judicial review in an appropriate court,	
19	within the time and in accordance with the procedures provided by law for review of	
20	decisions of administrative agencies in this jurisdiction.	
21	SECTION 213.11J. DISCRETIONARY RELIEF FROM REGISTRATION AND OTHER SENTENCING	
22	CONSEQUENCES AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES (1) Partition for Dispution and Paliaf At any time prior to the expiration of any	
23	(1) Petition for Discretionary Relief. At any time prior to the expiration of any	
24	sentencing consequences imposed under Section 213.11(3) or any collateral consequences	
25	applicable primarily to persons convicted of a sexual offense, including the obligation to	

register, the obligation to comply with associated duties, restrictions on occupation or

employment required by state law, collateral consequences imposed under Section 213.11(4),

and additional collateral consequences imposed under Section 213.11I(4), the registrant may

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Section 213.J. Discretionary Relief from Registration and Other Sentencing Consequences

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- petition the sentencing court, or other authority authorized by law, to order relief from all or part of those consequences. If the obligation to register or other consequences arose from an out-of-state conviction, the petition may be addressed to a court of general jurisdiction or other authority of this state in the place where the person concerned is registered.
- (2) Proceedings on Petition for Discretionary Relief. The authority to which the petition is addressed may either dismiss the petition summarily, in whole or in part, or institute proceedings to rule on the merits of the petition. If that authority chooses to entertain submissions, hear argument, or take evidence prior to ruling on the merits of the petition, it must give notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to participate in it to the prosecuting attorney for the offense out of which the obligation to register or other consequence arose. If the obligation to register or other consequence arose from an out-of-state conviction, notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to participate in it must be addressed to the principal prosecuting attorney in the jurisdiction of this state where the authority to which the petition is addressed is located.
- (3) Judgment on Proceedings for Discretionary Relief. Following proceedings for discretionary relief under subsection (2), the authority to which the petition is addressed may grant or deny relief, in whole or in part, from the obligation to register, any associated duties, and any of the sentencing consequences or collateral consequences in question. When that order terminates the registrant's obligation to register and to keep registry information current, subsequent disclosure of registry information is governed by subsection (5) of this Section. An order granting or denying relief following those proceedings must explain in writing the reasons for granting or denying relief.
- (4) Standard for Discretionary Relief. The authority to which the petition is addressed must grant relief if it finds, after proceedings to rule on the merits pursuant to subsection (2), that the sentencing consequence or collateral consequence in question is likely to impose a substantial burden on the registrant's ability to reintegrate into law-abiding society, and that public-safety considerations do not require continued imposition of the obligation, duty, or consequence after due consideration of:
 - (a) the nature of the offense;
 - (b) all other circumstances of the case;
 - (c) the registrant's prior and subsequent record of criminal convictions, if any;

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1	and
2	(d) the potential negative impacts of the burden, restriction, or government
3	action on the registrant, on the registrant's family, and on the registrant's prospects
4	for rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
5	Relief must not be denied arbitrarily or for any punitive purpose.
6	(5) Access to Registry Information after Discretionary Relief. When an order of
7	discretionary relief terminates the person's obligation to register and to keep registry
8	information current, all limits on access to registry information under Section 213.11H shall
9	remain in effect. Registry information recorded as of the date when discretionary relief takes
10	effect must remain available to any government law-enforcement agency seeking disclosure
11	of that information in compliance with Section 213.11H(1)(a) but must not otherwise be
12	disclosed.
13	(6) Notice to Other Jurisdictions Concerning Discretionary Relief.
14	(a) When discretionary relief is granted to a person under this Section, the
15	authority granting the order of relief must, upon the person's request, give notice of
16	that order to any other jurisdiction where the person concerned is registered or where
17	information about the person has been provided pursuant to Section 213.11D(4).
18	(b) When the other jurisdiction notified is a jurisdiction of this state, the notice
19	must specify that the other jurisdiction must extend the same relief from registration-
20	related duties and any other sentencing consequences or collateral consequences.
21	When that order terminates the registrant's obligation to register and to keep registry
22	information current, that notice must also specify the limits on subsequent disclosure
23	of registry information applicable under subsection (5).
24	(7) Proceedings Subsequent to Discretionary Relief. An order of discretionary relief
25	granted under this Section does not preclude the authority to which the petition was
26	addressed from later revoking that order if, on the basis of the registrant's subsequent
27	conduct or any other substantial change in circumstances, the authority finds by a
28	preponderance of the evidence that public-safety considerations, weighed against the burden
29	on the registrant's ability to reintegrate into law-abiding society, no longer justify the order

30

of relief.

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- 1 (8) Confidentiality. In any proceedings under this Section to consider whether to grant
- 2 or deny discretionary relief, the official responsible for making the determination must
- 3 insure that the identity of the registrant concerned remains confidential.

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APPENDIX C

PERTINENT MODEL PENAL CODE PROVISIONS*

- * Pertinent provisions of the 1962 Model Penal Code are reproduced below, numbered as they appear in that Code. These provisions of the 1962 Code are reproduced verbatim, except that the gendered language used in the 1962 Code has been replaced by gender-neutral terms used in the other parts of the 1962 Code, such as "the person" or "the actor."
- 1.12 Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt; Affirmative Defenses; Burden of Proving Fact When Not an Element of an Offense; Presumptions
- (1) No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.
- (2) Subsection (1) of this Section does not:
 - (a) require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless and until there is evidence supporting such defense; or
 - (b) apply to any defense that the Code or another statute plainly requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence.

1.13 General Definitions

In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is required:

- (5) "conduct" means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions;
- (6) "actor" includes, where relevant, a person guilty of an omission; ***
- (9) "element of an offense" means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or (iii) such a result of conduct as
 - (a) is included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; or
 - (b) establishes the required kind of culpability; or

- (c) negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or
- (d) negatives a defense under the statute of limitations; or
- (e) establishes jurisdiction or venue;
- (10) "material element of an offense" means an element that does not relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue, or to any other matter similarly unconnected with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct;
- (11) "purposely" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as "with purpose," "designed" or "with design" have the same meaning;
- (12) "intentionally" or "with intent" means purposely;
- (13) "knowingly" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as "knowing" or "with knowledge" have the same meaning;
- (14) "recklessly" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as "recklessness" or "with recklessness" have the same meaning;
- (15) "negligently" has the meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms such as "negligence" or "with negligence" have the same meaning;
- (16) "reasonably believes" or "reasonable belief" designates a belief that the actor is not reckless or negligent in holding.

2.02 General Requirements of Culpability

- (1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.
- (2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
 - (a) Purposely.

A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:

(i) if the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or a result thereof, it is the person's conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and

(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, the person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or the person believes or hopes that they exist.

(b) Knowingly.

A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:

- (i) if the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or the attendant circumstances, the person is aware that the person's conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
- (ii) if the element involves a result of the person's conduct, the person is aware that it is practically certain that the person's conduct will cause such a result.

(c) Recklessly.

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when the person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from the person's conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.

(d) Negligently.

A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when the person should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from the person's conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.

(3) Culpability Required Unless Otherwise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.

(4) Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. (5) Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge. When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely.

- 2.03 Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result; Divergence Between Result Designed or Contemplated and Actual Result or Between Probable and Actual Result
- (1) Conduct is the cause of a result when:
 - (a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and
 - (b) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense.
- (2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless:
 - (a) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or

- (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just]¹ bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the actor's offense.
- (3) When recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which the actor should be aware unless:
 - (a) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
 - (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of the actor's offense.
- (4) When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.

2.12 De Minimis Infractions

The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, with regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:

- (a) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negatived by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense; or
- (b) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
- (c) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense.

¹ The commentary at p. 261 n.16 explains: "The word 'just' is in brackets because of disagreement within the Institute over whether it is wise to put undefined questions of justice to the jury...."

The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under subsection (3) of this Section without filing a written statement of its reasons.

- 4.10. Immaturity Excluding Criminal Conviction; Transfer of Proceedings to Juvenile Court²
- (1) A person shall not be tried for or convicted of an offense if:
 - (a) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense the person was less than sixteen years of age [, in which case the Juvenile Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction]; or
 - (b) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense the person was sixteen or seventeen years of age, unless:
 - (i) the Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction over the person, or,
 - (ii) the Juvenile Court has entered an order waiving jurisdiction and consenting to the institution of criminal proceedings against the person.
- (2) No court shall have jurisdiction to try or convict a person of an offense if criminal proceedings against the person are barred by Subsection (1) of this Section. When it appears that a person charged with the commission of an offense may be of such an age that criminal proceedings may be barred under Subsection (1) of this Section, the Court shall hold a hearing thereon, and the burden shall be on the prosecution to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that the criminal proceeding is not barred upon such grounds. If the Court determines that the proceeding is barred, custody of the person charged shall be surrendered to the Juvenile Court, and the case, including all papers and processes relating thereto, shall be transferred.

210.0 Definitions

(2) "bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition;

² This Section of the 1962 Code was not included in prior Drafts for this project, but it is pertinent now because of a Section 213.8 amendment that passed in June.

- (3) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
- (4) "deadly weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.